MAZHAR HUSSAIN KAZMI vs THE FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through the General Manager, Pakistan Railways and another
The petitioner, a civil servant, sought leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed his appeal regarding the denial of increments for improved academic qualifications on the ground of limitation. The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal erred in refusing to condone the delay in filing the departmental appeal where the petitioner had previously pursued a civil suit despite established law barring civil court jurisdiction over terms and conditions of service. The Supreme Court held that the Service Tribunal committed no legal error in refusing to condone the delay, noting that pursuing a remedy in a civil court with clear jurisdictional bars since 1973 and 1974 did not constitute a bona fide act done with due care and caution, and further observed that the petitioner failed to establish an absolute right to the increments on merits. The petition for leave to appeal was accordingly dismissed.
- Whether time spent in prosecuting a civil suit regarding terms and conditions of service can be condoned for the purpose of limitation before a Service Tribunal?
- Does improvement of educational qualifications automatically entitle a civil servant to increments as of right under an incentive scheme?
- Whether filing a suit in a civil court despite settled law barring its jurisdiction constitutes a bona fide act for condoning delay?
- Article 212(3), Constitution of Pakistan 1973
' SHAFIUR RAHMAN, J.---The Petitioner, a civil servant, seeks leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal dated 29-4-1985 whereby his appeal against the denial of specified increments on improvement of his qualifications, was dismissed.
2. The Petitioner claims to be employed earlier in the Commercial Department and later in the Educational Department. When he entered service in 1963, he was a matriculate. He improved his qualifications by becoming a F.Sc. In 1964, a B.Sc. In 1966 and M.Sc. In 1970. He was under incentive scheme and claimed the increments allowable on such improvement of qualifications. The Service Tribunal examined the entire history of the case and found that the claim was untenable on the following ground:-- "The appellant having been refused payment went to the Civil Court on 3-7-1983, but the suit was dismissed for want of jurisdiction on 26-09-1984. The departmental appeal was filed on 12-11-1984, when the cause of action had admittedly accrued to the appellant on or before 3-7-1983, when he filed the civil suit. The departmental appeal, in these circumstances was hopelessly barred by time, as from the date of cause of action, only one month's period was available to the appellant. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that the appellant was bona fide pursuing the remedy before the civil Court, and that the time spent in that Court deserves to be condoned. In this argument, there is no substance, for the law was clear on the point since 1973 and 1974 that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain a suit relating to the terms and conditions of service of a civil servant. We cannot, therefore, say that the appellant's action in going to the Civil Court was bona fide. An act done without the care and caution is never recognised as an act done in good faith."
3. The learned counsel for the Petitioner has challenged the refusal of the Service Tribunal to condone the delay as good reasons were available in support of condonation of delay and has taken us to the merits of the case to show the justification of it.
4. On the question of limitation we find that there is no legal error whatsoever. The Tribunal was justified in taking into consideration the factors which it has taken in condoning or not condoning the delay that took place. On merits the learned counsel has also not been able to show that improvement of qualifications necessarily entitled the Petitioner to its grant of the increments as of right.
5. In the circumstances we find that no case is made out for leave to appeal nd the Petition is dismissed.