MOHAMMAD SHABBIR AND Others vs BASHIR AHMAD
This petition for special leave to appeal arose from a pre-emption suit decreed in favour of the respondent on the condition of depositing the pre-emption amount by a specified date, failing which the suit would stand dismissed. On the final day of the deposit period, the respondent filed an appeal challenging the valuation of the land and obtained an ex parte interim order from the District Judge extending the deposit deadline. Although the appeal was ultimately dismissed without a fresh extension, the respondent had deposited the amount within the extended period while the appeal was pending. The petitioners challenged the District Judge's competence to extend the deposit time. The Supreme Court held that an appeal is a continuation of the suit, and the appellate court is fully competent under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to pass an interim order extending the deposit time. Refusing to exercise such power would render the statutory right of appeal infructuous.
- Whether an appellate court has the competence under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to extend the time for depositing pre-emption money fixed by the trial court?
- Is an appellant in a pre-emption suit legally obliged to deposit the pre-emption money within the trial court's deadline to preserve their right of appeal?
- Does the dismissal of an appeal on merits invalidate a deposit made within an extended period granted by an interim order of the appellate court?
- Section 22, Punjab Pre-emption Act
- Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure 1908
ORDER
1. SALAHUDDIN AHMED, J.-This petition for special leave arises out of a suit for pre-emption instituted by the respondent against Murad Ahmad, predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners. The suit was decreed in favour of the plaintiff on payment of Rs. 20,000 on or before the 23rd of April 1965, after deducting 1 /5th of the amount already deposited by him under section 22 of the Punjab Pre- emption Act. In default of the payment as directed it was order, d that the suit would stand dismissed with costs.
2. Upon an appeal preferred by the plaintiff -respondent on the ground that the value of the land fixed by the trial Court was excessive, the learned District Judge on the application of the respondent herein passed the following interim order ex parte on the 23rd of April 1965 :- "The period of depositing the pre-emption amount is extended up to 21-5-1965. Notice to the respondent for date . . . . . . . . . . ."
3. The respondent's appeal was, however, dismissed on the 4th of May 1965, and the judgment end decree of the trial Court were maintained in their entirety. No fresh time was allowed to deposit the pre-emption amount. In the meantime the pre-emption amount was deposited within the aforesaid extended period as contained in the interim order of the learned District Judge, arid at a time when the appeal was still pending.
4. The revision petition filed by Murad Ahmad against the order of the learned District Judge was dismissed on the 7th of July 1972, by a learned Single Judge of the High Court. The petitioners now seek leave to appeal from this order.
5. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that the learned District Judge was not competent to extend by an Interim order the time of payment of the pre-emption amount as fixed by the trial Court.
6. This contention was rightly rejected by the learned Judge of the High Court on the basis of the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of F. A. Khan v. Government of Pakistan (PLD 1964 SC 520) and Shah Wall v. Ghulam Din (PLD 1966 SC 983). In the latter case the observations relied on in particular appeared in the dissentient judgments of Chief Justice Cornelius and Hamoodur Rahman, J. As they then were.
7. The appeal before the District Judge was of right. As the appeal was a continuation of the suit, the learned District judge was fully competent under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure to pass the interim order in question. 7 he appeal having been filed on the very date the time fixed by the trial Court for the payment of the pre-emption money was due to expire, a refusal to exercise such power would not only have been improper but would have had the effect of making the appeal itself infructuous, and depriving the respondent of his statutory right of appeal.
8. It may be contended that the respondent could have deposited the money within the time specified by the trial Court, and pursued his appeal.
9. The law, however, does not oblige the appellant to do so, and the respondent was therefore not bound to do so.
10. The order of the learned Single Judge is perfectly legal, and we fully agree with his reasons therefore. The petition is accordingly dismissed.
Cited by 7 cases
- Ijaz Hussain etc vs Qaisar Mahmood etc 2020 LHC 1396, 2021 YLR 183, 2022 KLR Civil Cases 309
- Mst. SUGHRAN BIBI vs MUHAMMAD YUNUS and 3 others 2002 YLR 1664
- MUHAMMAD RAMZAN and others vs MUHAMMAD YAHYA 2002 YLR 1592
- CHIRAGH AND 4 mumss vs NIZAM DIN AND 4 OTHERS 1985 PLD Lahore 101
- MUHAMMAD ASHRAF KHAN vs Mst. PAHMIDA KHANUM 1982 PLD Supreme Court 398
- KHURSHID AKBAR vs Mian MANZUR AHMED AND Another 1982 SCMR 824
- GHULAM MUHAMMAD AND Another vs IRSHAD AHMED AND Another 1982 PLD Supreme Court 282