Mst. RAJ BIBI and others vs GHULAM SARWAR and another
This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioners' regular second appeal regarding the specific performance of an agreement to sell back land. Briefly, the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners sold land to a respondent who simultaneously executed an agreement to reconvey a portion of the land upon payment within a specified period. Subsequently, that initial sale was successfully pre-empted by another respondent, who was substituted in place of the original vendee. The trial court decreed the suit for specific performance, but the appellate court reversed it, and the High Court upheld that dismissal. The core legal question is whether an agreement to reconvey land executed by a vendee is enforceable against a successful pre-emptor who has been substituted for the vendee by a pre-emption decree. The Supreme Court held that the claim for specific performance is not enforceable against the successful pre-emptor because there is no privity of contract between the pre-emptor and the vendor. The Court dismissed the petition, laying down the principle that a pre-emptor substituted through a successful pre-emption decree is not bound by an agreement to reconvey entered into by the original vendee.
- Whether an agreement to reconvey land is enforceable against a successful pre-emptor who is substituted for the original vendee?
- Does a pre-emptor who successfully pre-empts a sale become bound by a separate agreement to sell executed by the original vendee?
- Is there privity of contract between a pre-emptor and the vendor under an agreement executed by the original vendee?
ORDER
1. ' JAVID IQBAL, J.--This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, dated 6th July, 1985 whereby R.SA. Of the petitioners was dismissed.
2. ' Briefly the facts are that Umar Din predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners sold 23 Kanals 7 Marlas of land in Khasra Nos. 1728, 1729 and 1758 to Ismail respondent on 14 February 1975. In return Ismail respondent entered into an agreement with the said Umar Din to sell him back land measuring 15 Kanals 7 Marlas thereof comprising of Khasra Nos. 1728 and 1729 in the event of his paying to him Rs, 17,000 within a period of 4 years. On 14 February 1976 the sale in favour of Ismail respondent was successfully pre-empted by Ghulam Sarwar respondent. Subsequently Umar Din filed suit for specific performance of agreement as against Ismail respondent in which he also joined Ghulam Sarwar respondent as defendants. The suit was decreed by the trial Court but on appeal of the respondents the Additional District Judge reversed the decree on the ground inter alia that there was evidence on record that the agreement had been executed by Ismail respondent before acquiring the actual sale of the disputed property in his favour. Thereafter, the successors-in-interest of Umar Din challenged the judgment of the Additional District Judge by way of RSA which as stated above has been dismissed. Hence the present petition for leave to appeal.
3. ' It was argued by learned counsel before us that the learned Judge of the High Court was wrong in arriving at the conclusion that the sale in favour of Ismail respondent having been successfully pre-empted by Ghulam Sarwar respondent the agreement to sell back, dated 14 February 1975 was not to be enforced as against the respondents. It was submitted that the decree for possession through pre-emption was obtained by the respondents in a collusive manner.
4. We have heard learned counsel at some length. It appears- that the transaction in which Umar Din had entered into an agreement with Ismail respondent was probably for achieving some ulterior motive possibly like defeating the claim of the pre-emptor. But since the sale in favour of Ismail respondent had been successfully pre-empted by Ghulam Sarwar respondent, he was substituted for Ismail respondent and since there was no privity of contract between him and the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, the claim to sell back was not open to be enforced as against him. Since this is the position we do not find any substance in this petition which is accordingly dismissed.