MUHAMMAD BASHIR vs MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, WAZIRABAD THROUGH ITS
This is a petition for the review of an order dismissing a civil petition for special leave to appeal as being barred by time. The core legal question revolves around the computation of limitation for filing a petition for special leave to appeal and whether the time spent pursuing a certificate of fitness under the Letters Patent automatically extends limitation or requires continuous diligence for condonation of delay. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, holding that limitation runs from the date of the High Court judgment, and time spent in pursuing a certificate of fitness may only be condoned if the petitioner proves continuous diligence. The key principle laid down is that a petitioner seeking condonation of delay must explain each day's delay and establish continuous diligence, and that a misconception regarding the starting point of limitation does not constitute a valid ground for review.
- Does limitation for filing a petition for special leave to appeal begin from the date of the High Court judgment or from the date of refusal of a certificate under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent?
- Is time spent in pursuing a certificate of fitness under the Letters Patent automatically excluded for limitation purposes?
- What must a petitioner demonstrate in order to obtain condonation of delay for filing a petition for special leave to appeal?
- Can the merits of a petition be examined when the petition is barred by time and no sufficient ground for condonation of delay is established?
ORDER
1. HAMOODUR RAHMAN, C. J.-This is a petition for the review of an order of this Court dismissing Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 76 of 1972 on the 2nd of October 1972, as being barred by time.
2. The said petition was filed on the 14th of December 1971, for leave to appeal from the judgment and order of a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court dated the 9th of December 1970. It was accompanied with an application for condonation of delay. The ground on which condonation was sought was that the petitioner applied on the 6th of January 1971, for the grant of certificate of fitness for filing an appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the High Court and this application was ultimately dismissed on the 7th of May 1971, treating it as a review. He then made another application for a certificate for filing a Letters Patent appeal and this was dismissed on the 13th of September 1971. He then applied for a copy of the order refusing the certificate on the 14th of September 1971. He was not given any date for collecting the copy, and as such he took delivery of the copy on the basis of his own personal enquiry on the 20th of October 1971. When delivery was taken, it was found that the copy had been made ready for delivery on the 12th of October 1971.
3. Even so, no explanation was given in the petition for condonation as to what the petitioner was doing from the 20th of October 1971, to the 13th of December 1971. In this view of the matter, the Court was of the opinion that the petitioner had not shown that he was throughout diligent, nor had he explained each day's delay. The petition was accordingly dismissed.
4. He now seeks to have this order reviewed, firstly, on the ground that from the date he took delivery of the copy, the petition for special leave to appeal was filed within time. This is on the supposition that limitation began to run from the date of refusal of the certificate under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. This is an entirely misconceived notion. It is now well settled that limitation begins to run from the date of the judgment of a learned single Judge, but the time spent in obtaining a certificate under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent or pursuing a proceeding under Clause of the Letters Patent may be condoned, if the petitioner has satisfied this Court that he had been diligent throughout. If authority is needed for this proposition, reference may be made to the case of Paresh Chandra Biswa s v. Tapen Kanti Choudhury (PLD 1963 SC 598). This is no ground, therefore, for review.
5. The next ground on which the review was sought pertains to the merit of the petition. It is not possible to go into the merits of the petition until the petitioner can get over the hurdle of limitation.
6. Since we are of the e view that on this question of limitation no valid ground for the review of our previous order has been made out, the petitioner cannot be allowed to go into the merits of his case.
7. This petition for review is without any substance and is accordingly dismissed.