Pakistan Case Law
1974 SCMR 223

MUHAMMAD NAWAZ AND 3 Others vs Mst. SAKINA BIBI AND 3 Other

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Citation1974 SCMR 223
CourtSupreme Court of Pakistan
Case No.Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 500 of 1972 R. S. A. No. 78 of
Date1973-10-01
Judge(s)Hamoodur Rahman, C. J. and Muhammad Gul
Authored byMuhammad Gul
ResultPetition dismissed
AI Summary — generated from this judgment; read the full text below and verify before relying on it.

This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan through a leave petition filed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court regarding the inheritance of non-ancestral land left by a deceased unmarried person, which devolved upon his sisters in preference to a collateral in the fifth degree. The core legal question concerns whether the explanation provided by the petitioners constitutes sufficient cause for the condonation of a 59-day delay in filing the petition. The Supreme Court held that the petition is barred by limitation as the petitioners failed to demonstrate sufficient cause for the delay, ruling that the initial obligation to inquire about the decision rests upon the litigant, and mere negligence or failure of counsel to inform the client does not constitute sufficient ground for condonation of delay when a valuable right has accrued to the opposing party. The key principle laid down is that a party must show constant diligence and care in pursuing legal remedies, and the default of a counsel alone, without active diligence by the litigant, does not justify condonation of long delay.

Questions settled in this judgment
  • Does the failure of a counsel to inform his client about the announcement of a judgment constitute sufficient cause for the condonation of delay under the law of limitation?
  • Whose initial obligation is it to inquire about the decision of an appeal when judgment is reserved and delivered in the absence of the parties?
  • Can negligence on the part of a legal counsel per se justify the condonation of a long delay in filing a petition when a valuable right has accrued to the opposite party?
limitationcondonation of delaysufficient causeleave to appealinheritancenegligence of counsel

MUHAMMAD GUL, J.-This leave petition is against the judgment dated 22nd June 1972 of the learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, holding that on the death of Khurshid, a Jat of Kot Ladha, district Gujran--wala, who died unmarried, his non-ancestral land devolved upon his three sisters respondents Nos. 1 to 3 herein in preference to a collateral in the fifth degree. This petition was filed on 19th October 1972 which after allowing time spent in obtaining copies of the judgment is beyond time by 59 days.

2. In their application for condonation of delay, the petitioners have stated that after the conclusion of the arguments in appeal in the High Court, the judgment was reserved on 10th February 1972 and delivered on 22nd June 1972 of which no intimation was given to them by their counsel Mr. Fazle Husain. It was only on 12th September 1972 when one of the petitioners came to enquire from the counsel, that he was informed that the appeal had been decided. But even then counsel did not inform him about the actual date of the decision. Later, on obtaining copy of the judgment it transpired that the judgment in the appeal was announced on 22nd June 1972. It is further stated that Mr. Fazle Husain initially did not return the brief on the plea that it had been misplaced. It was only after obtaining a writing from the petitioners that they would not make any claim against him in respect of the case that the brief was returned to them.

3. Even if the above explanation is to be taken at its face value, it would not constitute a sufficient cause for the condonation of long delay that has taken place in the instant case. The initial obligation was of the petitioners to enquire about the decision in their appeal, or to arrange with their counsel to inform them about the decision if it is announced in their absence. Even if it be assumed that their counsel neglected to inform them that per se would not be a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, when a valuable right has accrued to the respondents Nos. 1 to 3. We are not satisfied that the petitioners were diligent or took due care in the matter.

4. The petition is dismissed as barred by limitation.

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