MUHAMMAD SHAFI vs THE MEMBER (REVENUE), BOARD OF REVENUE, ETC.
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the appointment of a Lambardar, where the petitioner challenged the selection of a rival candidate by the revenue authorities. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the appointment of a Lambardar is a purely discretionary administrative act or a right-based process governed strictly by specific rules. The High Court had previously determined that the appointment of a Lambardar constitutes an administrative measure rather than a matter of right, a position supported by established precedent. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed this stance, holding that the appointment process remains within the discretion of the competent authorities. The Court refused to interfere with the lower court's decision, thereby reinforcing the principle that the selection of a Lambardar is an administrative function where candidates cannot claim an inherent right to the office. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, maintaining that such appointments are not subject to the same rigorous legal entitlement claims as other civil rights.
- Is the appointment of a Lambardar a matter of right or a discretionary administrative measure?
- Can a candidate claim an inherent right to the office of Lambardar against a selection made by revenue authorities?
- Rule 19(i), West Pakistan Land Revenue Rules 1968
- Rule 19(ii), West Pakistan Land Revenue Rules 1968
ORDER
1. SALAHUDDIN AHMED, J.-The petitioner was one of the two candidates for the appointment of Lambardar, but the authorities having compared the merits of the candidates appointed respondent No. 3 Taj Muhammad as the Lambardar.
2. The High Court had taken the view that the appointment of Lambardar was essentially an administrative measure and no claim to that office could be laid as of right. This view was based upon a decision of this Court in the case of Abdul Wahid v. The Member, Board of Revenue Punjab and another (1971 SCMR 719) While refusing leave to appeal we agreed with the view adopted by the High Court.
3. The only ground urged before us for review is based on ground No. (g) of the petition for special leave to appeal and it reads as follows :- "The observation of the learned Single Judge that the appointment of Lambardar is purely discretionary, it is submitted with utmost respect, is not consistent with the provisions of rule 19(i) read with sub-rule (ii), as has been explained in the foregoing paragraphs."
4. The petition is accordingly dismissed. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.