MUHAMMAD YOUSAF BEG vs CENTRAL BOARD OF REVENUE AND Another
The petitioner sought special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan against an order of the Sind & Baluchistan High Court refusing to grant a stay of realisation of a penalty imposed under the Sea Customs Act pending the final hearing of his constitutional petition. The core legal question was whether the Supreme Court should interfere with the High Court's discretionary refusal to grant interim relief. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that it is not the practice of the Court to interfere with discretionary orders of interim relief unless they are shown to be palpably unjust, capricious, or perverse, which was not established in this case. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with a High Court's exercise of discretion regarding interim relief during pending writ proceedings absent clear perversity or injustice.
- Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a High Court's discretionary refusal to grant a stay of realisation of a penalty pending a constitutional petition?
- Does the admission of a constitutional petition for regular hearing by itself amount to a stay of the realisation of a penalty?
- Section 167(8-b), Sea Customs Act
- Section 167(8), Sea Customs Act
- Dangerous Drugs Act, 1930
- Section 189, Sea Customs Act
- Article 201, Interim Constitution
ORDER
1. HAMOODUR RAHMAN, C. J.-On the 18th of May 1965, the petitioner shipped 50 bales of Pakistan cotton waste from Karachi to Hong Kong. The consignment was subjected to a detailed check up at Hong Kong on the 28th of July 1.965, and 154 lbs. Of raw opium was recovered therefrom. As a result of this, the Hong Kong Police arrested the petitioner on the 1st of August 1965, and charged him for importing and possessing opium. He was tried by a competent Court at Hong Kong which acquitted him on the 5th of November 1965.
2. Thereafter, the petitioner returned to Karachi and on the 3rd of May 1966, was served with a show- cause notice from the Collector of Customs under section 167(8-b) of the Sea Customs Act for exporting opium outside Pakistan. Contrary to the provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1930, he was tried along with three other persons and convicted under section 167(8-b) and 167(8:) of the Sea Customs Act. The petitioner was imposed a penalty of Rs. 20,000.
3. The petitioner appealed against this order but the Central Board of Revenue rejected his appeal on the ground that he had failed to deposit the penalty in accordance with the provisions of section 189 of the Sea Customs Act. He then went in revision to the Central Government, but his revision was also rejected.
4. Finally, he invoked the writ jurisdiction of the Sind & Baluchistan High Court at Karachi under Article 201 of the Interim Constitution. His petition was admitted to regular hearing but his prayer for stay of realisation of the penalty was refused.
5. The main petition is still pending in High Court but the petitioner seeks special leave to appeal from the order refusing the stay.
6. The learned counsel appearing in support of this petition concedes that the admission of the petition under Article 201 of the Interim Constitution for regular hearing does not by itself amount to a stay of the realisation of the penalty but contends that since the admission of the main petition indicates the existence of a prima facie case, the High Court should have granted the stay because the realisation of the fine would cause irreparable harm and injury to the petitioner.
7. We are not impressed by this argument. It was in the discretion of the High Court to grant the interim relief prayed for or not. The High Court has in the exercise of its discretion refused to do so.
8. The question is whether we should interfere with such a discretionary order. It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with such discretionary orders unless it is shown that the order is palpably unjust or capricious or perverse. We are not satisfied that the order suffers from any one of these defects. There is, therefore, no ground for interference.
9. Since the main petition under Article 201 has been admitted for regular hearing the authorities concerned will, we feel sure, stay their hands till the disposal of the petition. At the same time, we hope that the High Court will take up the hearing of the main petition at an early date.
10. With these observations, this petition is dismissed.