WATER AND POWER DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and others vs MUNIR AHMAD
This matter arises from two petitions for special leave to appeal filed by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) against judgments of the Federal Service Tribunal. The respondents, former employees of WAPDA, were removed from service under Section 17(1A) of the Water and Power Development Authority Act. On appeal, the Federal Service Tribunal upheld that there were sufficient grounds for action but converted the removal orders into retirement orders. The core legal question was whether the Federal Service Tribunal, upon finding valid grounds for action under Section 17(1A), possesses the jurisdiction to interfere with the discretion of the Authority regarding the quantum or nature of the penalty imposed. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal, acting as an appellate authority, is fully competent to examine both the material justifying the action and the appropriateness of the specific order made, as no restriction is placed on its competency by the statute. The petitions were accordingly dismissed.
- Whether the Federal Service Tribunal can interfere with the nature of the order passed by the Water and Power Development Authority under Section 17(1A)?
- Does the Water and Power Development Authority Act restrict the appellate competency of the Federal Service Tribunal regarding the quantum of punishment?
- Section 17(1A), Water and Power Development Authority Act
ORDER
' SAAD SAOOD JAN, J.---These are two petitions for special leave to appeal from the judgments of the Federal Service Tribunal. The respondents in these petitions were employees of the petitioner authority. They were removed from service by the Authority under the provisions of section 17(IA), Water and Power Development Authority Act. They preferred appeals before the Federal Service Tribunal. The learned Tribunal found that the petitioner Authority had sufficient grounds for not retaining them in service but converted the orders of removal into orders of retirement from service. The petitioner Authority seeks leave to appeal from the order of the learned Tribunal.
2. In support of these petitions it is contended that after the learned Tribunal found that there were good grounds with the Authority for taking action against the respondents under section 17(IA), it was not open to it to interfere with its discretion with regard to the nature of the orders made. It is difficult to accept this contention. The learned Tribunal as an Appellate Authority can not only examine whether there was material before the petitioner Authority for invoking the provisions of section 17(IA) but also consider whether the nature of the order made was appropriate. There is nothing in section 17, or in any other provision of the WAPDA Act which may be taken to restrict the competency of the Tribunal in this regard. These petitions are without any merit and are hereby dismissed.