AKBER ALI And Another vs MUHAMMAD KHAN And Other
The petitioners filed a suit for a perpetual injunction to restrain the respondents from dispossessing them from a parcel of land, claiming they were in possession through a partnership with a lessee (respondent No. 34) who had an oral lease agreement with the respondent-owners. The trial court granted an interim injunction only for the portion of land covered by the lease, dismissing the application for the remainder. This decision was upheld by the District Judge in appeal and subsequently by the High Court in civil revision. The petitioners sought leave to appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court observed that the respondent-owners had no agreement with the petitioners and that the petitioners' claim based on the lessee's title did not extend to the entire land in dispute. Finding no evidence that the lower courts had excluded material evidence or erred in their concurrent findings, the Supreme Court held that mere possession of the land is insufficient to warrant interference with concurrent findings of fact. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was refused.
- Can a petitioner claim an injunction based on a partnership with a lessee when the owner has no agreement with the petitioner?
- Does mere possession of land constitute sufficient grounds to interfere with concurrent findings of the lower courts in a civil revision?
- Is an interim injunction grantable for land not covered by a lease agreement?
- Order XXXIX Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure 1908
- Order XXXIX Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure 1908
- Section 115, Code of Civil Procedure 1908
ORDER
ABDUL QADEER CHAUDHRY, J: --The petitioners alongwith respondent No.34 filed a suit against respondents Nos. 1 to 33 claiming perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from dispossessing the plaintiffs from the land measuring 110 Kanals 19 Marlas situate in Moza Kala Gujran, Tehsil and District Rawalpindi. The suit was filed on the averments that the suit land belonged to the respondents 1 to 33 who had leased out the said land for the purpose of Brick-Kiln by an oral agreement to respondent No.34 who entered into a partnership with the petitioner with the consent of respondents Nos. 1 to 33. The suit was contested by the respondents. Alongwith the suit, the petitioners had filed an application under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. Which was granted by the trial Judge with respect to a part of the suit land. The petition was dismissed with respect to the land not covered by the lease. The petitioners filed an appeal in the Court of District Judge who dismissed the same on 19-12-1988. A civil revision was filed in the High Court under section 115, C.P.C. Which was also dismissed by judgment dated 23-1-1989. Hence the present petition for leave to appeal.
2. It is an admitted position that respondents Nos.1 to 33 are the owners of the land. An interim injunction was granted in respect of the land which was given on lease to Tauqir Shah. The owner respondents had not entered into any agreement with the petitioners.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the petitioners were in possession of the land on which Brick-Kiln was functioning. This is no ground to interfere with the concurrent finding of the Courts below. The respondent-owners had not accepted the claim of the petitioners.
The petitioners had based their claim on the title of Tauqir Shah but Tauqir Shah had not been given the entire land. There is no material evidence which has been excluded by the Courts below.
There is no force in this petition. Leave to appeal is refused.