REHMAT ALI vs MEMBER, BOARD OF REVENUE AND Another
This petition for special leave to appeal challenges the refusal of the Lahore High Court to interfere with the appointment of a Lambardar. The core legal question concerns whether the appointment should be governed by sub-rule (1) or sub-rule (2) of rule 17 of the Land Revenue Rules, hinging on the interpretation of the nature of land holdings in the Patti and the effect of acquisition under section 4 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of the revenue authorities that the major portion of the land belonged to the Government were correct, as evacuees had not acquired proprietary rights, thereby rendering sub-rule (1) applicable where heredity is not the determining factor. The Court reaffirmed the principle that the appointment of a Lambardar is an administrative action not generally amenable to writ jurisdiction, and that the assessment of suitability by statutory authorities lies within their exclusive jurisdiction. The petition was accordingly dismissed.
- Whether the appointment of a Lambardar is in the nature of an administrative action amenable to writ jurisdiction?
- Does the acquisition of land under section 4 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act convert tenancy rights into proprietary rights without payment of Government dues?
- Whether heredity is the determining factor for the appointment of a Lambardar under sub-rule (1) of rule 17 of the Land Revenue Rules where the major portion of the land belongs to the Government?
- Section 4, Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act
ORDER
1. ANWAR-UL-HAQ, J.-This petition for special leave to appeal seeks to call in question tae refusal of the Lahore High Court, by its order dated the 1st of March 1973, to interfere with the appointment of the respondent, Abdul karim, as Lambardar of Chak No. 495/BB in the district of Multan.
2. It was contended before the High Court that the petitioner was entitled to the appointment on the ground of heredity and that the learned Collector and the superior revenue officers, including the Board of Revenue, were to error in thinking that the case fell to be decided under sub-rule (1) instead of sub-rule (l) of rule 11 of the Land Revenue Rules. It may be stated that under the first sub rule heredity is not the deciding factor. The contention was, however, repelled by the High Court on the ground that the revenue authorities had bound that the major portion of the land in the Patti concerned was owned by Government, and that was a finding with which the High Court could not interfere. The High Court further observed that in accordance with the principles laid down by the High Court itself and by the Supreme Court in several decided cases, the appointment of a Lambardar was in the nature of an administra--tive action and was not amenable to control by the High Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction.
3. It is submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that the real question arising in the case was one of interpretation of the true nature of the holdings comprised in this Patti, and that was a question of law and not of fact. According to the learned counsel, the revenue authorities and tile high Court had failed to consider the effect of the acquisition of 119 acres of evacuee land by the Central Government under section 4 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, and the transfer of this area on a permanent basis to displaced persons under the Act. It is contended that if this area had been excluded from the area of Government land, then the appointment of the Lambardar would have been regulated by sub-rule (2) of rule 17 aforesaid, with the result that the petitioner would have got the appointment on the basis of heredity.
4. After hearing the learned counsel at some length, we arc of the view that the submission made by him suffers from a patent fallacy. It has been recorded as a finding of fact by the revenue authorities at various, levels that in the area in question evacuees had not acquired proprietary rights by paying tile Government dues, and, therefore, tile acquisition of tilts laud under section 4 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act A only had the effect of placing the tenancy rights of the evacuees in the compensation pool, and not of converting those rights into proprietary rights. It is well-settled that acquisition to such cases is continued only to the interest of the evacuees, and cannot extend to the acquisition of non-- evacuee rights. Such being the case, the conclusions as to the nature of the holdings reached by tile Collector and upheld in appeal and revision by the Divisional Commissioner and the Bard of Revenue do not appear to be open any objection. As the major portion of the area comprised in the Patti belonged to the Government, the appointment was to be made under sub-rule (1) of rule 17 of tae Land Revenue Rules, under which heredity was not the determining factor.
5. On merits, all the statutory authorities have taken the view that the respondent was more fitted for the appointment than the petitioner ; that is an assessment which lies within their exclusive jurisdiction.
6. The High Court was also right in thinking that the appointment of Lambardar being an administrative action, is generally not susceptible to interference in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction.
7. For all these reasons, there is no merit in this petition which is, accordingly, dismissed.