Ch. JAMIL AHMAD vs NIPPON BOBBIN COMPANY (PAKISTAN) LTD.

' M. MAHBOOB AHMAD, C.J.---By this order we propose to deal with I.C.A. No.6 of 1986 and I.C.A. No.26 of 1987 as the two of them are between the same parties and common questions of law arise therein.

2. The first of these appeals is directed against order dated 29-6-1986 announced on 7-7-1986 and passed in C.M. No.414-L/86 and C.M. No.112-L/86 in C.O. No.48 of 1984, whilst the second calls in question order dated 7-7-1987 passed in C.M. No.470-L/86 and C.M. No.495-L/87 in C.O. No.48 of 1984.

3. The learned counsel for the appellant was asked to show how this appeal is competent when the order of winding up of the Company has admittedly been passed and by virtue of section 10(1) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 the appeal lies to the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The learned counsel has relied on Messrs Mehboob Industries Ltd. v. Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation Ltd. Reported as 1988 CLC 866 to contend that such an appeal has been held to be competent vide the above judgment. We are unable to agree with the contention raised as above.

A plain reading of section 10(1) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 shows that appeal against any order, decision or judgment of the Court passed under the Ordinance shall lie to the Supreme Court where the company ordered to be wound up has a paid-up share capital of not less than one million rupees; and, where the company ordered to be wound up has a paid-up capital of less than one million rupees, or has no share capital, such appeal shall' lie only if the Supreme Court grants leave to appeal.

4. The learned counsel while relying on the cited judgment of the Sindh High Court has stated that aforementioned provision viz. Section 10(1) should be read so as to be only applicable where a winding up order is to be challenged. Such a contention on the face of it is not tenable as the words used in section 10(1) in unequivocal and unambiguous terms are "appeal against any order decision or judgment of the Court ". The word "any" has a significant meaning and cannot be thrown out as redundant; it being the cardinal principle of interpretation that every word used in a provision has to be given effect unless there be any repugnancy or contradiction. Such a situation is not prevailing in the case in hand and therefore, word "any" has to be read in the provision which has sweeping connotation to cover all orders, decisions or judgments of the Court B passed under the Ordinance when the winding up order has already been made. The appeal envisaged by section 10(2) to our mind appears to be in such a case where the winding up order has not as yet been passed. The two provisions viz. Subsection (1) and subsection (2) therefore, stand reconciled that in case an appeal is to be preferred against any order, decision or judgment when an order of winding up has been passed, it will lie to the Supreme Court of Pakistan whether in the shape of appeal or petition for leave to appeal as the case may be and subsection (2) of section 10 will be attracted in respect of an order when winding up has not already been directed. This aspect of the matter was neither in issue in the cited judgment of the Sindh High Court nor has been discussed.

5. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the view that the present appeal is not competent before this Court. It is accordingly dismissed as incompetent. Parties are left to bear their own costs.