SULTAN AHMAD vs PROVINCE OF PUNJAB
This petition challenged the dismissal of a police constable, arguing that the Superintendent of Police lacked the authority to order a fresh departmental inquiry after the initial inquiry report was deemed unsatisfactory. The petitioner contended that the second inquiry subjected him to double jeopardy and violated the Punjab Police Rules, 1934. The Supreme Court held that the Superintendent of Police possesses the inherent authority to order a fresh inquiry if the initial proceedings are unsatisfactory. The Court clarified that departmental proceedings for misconduct do not constitute a criminal trial, and therefore, the principle of double jeopardy is inapplicable. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the petitioner's employment was held at the pleasure of the appointing authority, subject only to the requirement of a reasonable opportunity to show cause. Any rule restricting the appointing authority to a single inquiry would be ultra vires the Constitution. As the petitioner was afforded a full opportunity to defend himself, the dismissal was upheld, and the petition was dismissed.
- Does the Superintendent of Police have the authority to order a fresh departmental inquiry if the initial inquiry is unsatisfactory?
- Does the principle of double jeopardy apply to departmental proceedings for misconduct?
- Is a rule limiting the appointing authority to a single inquiry ultra vires the Constitution regarding the doctrine of pleasure?
- Rule 16.24, Punjab Police Rules 1934
MUHAMMAD GUL, J.-This leave petition is against the judgment of a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 183 of 1968, affirming that of a learned Single Judge by which an order dated 25th June 1959, dismissing the petitioner from police service was held to be valid.
2. The petitioner at the relevant time was employed as Detective Foot Constable and posted at Police Station, Saddar, Sialkot. He was charged with misconduct, the allegation against him holding at it, the performance of his duty as Detective Foot Constable, he had aces the bribe of Rs.25 from a villager. An enquiry was ordered by the Superintendent Police who incidentally was the appointing authority and entrusted it to a Prosecuting Inspector. The latter, after framing a formal charge recorded the evidence against the petitioner on 21st June 1958. The witnesses appearing against the petitioner stated that he accepted the bribe two days earlier that is to say, on 19th June 1958, the date being referred to in the evidence parson.
3. The petitioner on the other band led evidence to show that on 19 June 1958, he remained at the police station throughout and did not go to-- the village where he was alleged to have accepted the bribe. Nevertheless, the Inquiry Officer found the charge against the petitioner as proved. When the case was laid before the Superintendent Police for his orders, he did not feel satisfied with the proceedings and, therefore, ordered fresh ,, inquiry by the District Inspector Police. On the basis of the report in the second inquiry, the Superintendent Police vide order dated 25th June 1959, dismissed the petitioner. His appeal to Deputy Inspector-General and revision to the Additional Inspector-General having failed, be filed a suit for a declaration that the order of dismissal wasth illegal because the Superintendent Police had no power to direct a fresh inquiry by another Inquiry Officer. The plea prevailed in the trial Court and the petitioner's suit was decreed. The decree was also affirmed on appeal to the District Judge, but on further appeal by the Provincial Government, was reversed by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, which judgment was also upheld by a Division Bench in Letters Patent Appeal.
4. In support of the leave petition, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that under sub-rule (i) of rule 16.24 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934, the Superintendent Police could either exonerate the petitioner or punish him, but could not order a fresh inquiry. By the second inquiry, the petitioner, according to the learned counsel, suffered double jeopardy. In support of the argument, learned counsel relied on Wali Muhammad v. General Manager (Electricity), WAPDA and others (PLD 1964 Pesh. 167). The argument is fallacious. There is nothing in the relevant rule to forbid a fresh inquiry by the Superintendent Police. Even otherwise, it is not controverted that under the Constitution, the petitioner's office was at pleasure which was abridged only to the extent that he could not be dismissed or reduced in rank without being afforded a reasonable opportunity of show cause against the proposed action. In other respects, pleasure was unqualified. It is not disputed that the petitioner was given a full opportunity to show cause against his dismissal, and he had bad no grievance on that account. Any rule to provide that the power of appointing authority is limited to holding one inquiry will impinge upon "pleasure" of the appointing authority, and therefore, will be ultra vires the Constitution.
5. It is also difficult to understand how in the circumstances of the case, the petitioner had suffered double jeopardy. He was not tried for a criminal offence. Much less, he was acquitted of any offence. He was only charged with misconduct and the proceedings were conducted against him only to satisfy the appointing authority whether the petitioner was good enough to be retained in service, in the larger public interest which required surety of public services.
The precedent case relied upon by the learned counsel is distinguish--able on facts. In that case, the writ petitioner was absolved of the charges and re-instated. Nothing of the kind happened in the instant case. However that may be, the proposition enunciated in that case seems to be widely worded.
There is no force in the petition which is hereby dismissed.