Malik NASIM AHMAD vs ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, DERA GHAZI KHAN And 3
The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his writ petitions by the High Court, which had upheld the orders of the lower forums restoring a suit that was previously dismissed for default. The core legal question concerned the justification for setting aside the dismissal of the suit for default and whether the date of dismissal constituted a date of hearing. The Supreme Court held that the impugned judgment of the High Court in its discretionary writ jurisdiction suffered from no infirmity of law or principle. The Court laid down the principle that concurrent findings regarding the restoration of a suit dismissed for default, when properly arrived at without legal infirmity, will not be interfered with in discretionary writ jurisdiction or leave to appeal proceedings.
- Whether the High Court's discretionary writ jurisdiction can be invoked to interfere with the restoration of a suit dismissed for default?
- Does a date of dismissal for default constitute a date of hearing requiring specific notice?
- When will the Supreme Court grant leave to appeal against concurrent findings of lower courts regarding the restoration of suits?
ORDER
1. MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.---Leave to appeal has been sought by the defendant in these two petitions; against the dismissal by the High Court, of his writ petitions.
2. The suit of the respondent/plaintiff side was dismissed for default by the trial Court. Their application for restoration, however, was allowed on a finding that the date of dismissal for default was not a "date of hearing". The question of notice was also decided in their favour. Petitioner's challenge, to the trial Court orders, in the revisional jurisdiction of the District Court, failed.
3. Accordingly he filed writ petition in the High Court which having been dismissed he has now sought leave to appeal.
4. In addition to the arguments, raised before the High Court which were properly dealt with and repelled, learned counsel has also contended that there was no justification for setting aside, the dismissal of the suit for default.
5. After hearing the learned counsel on this question of fact as well, we have not been able to find any justification for grant of leave to appeal; as the impugned judgment, in the discretionary writ jurisdiction of the High Court, does not suffer from any infirmity either of law or principle. Leave to appeal, accordingly, is refused.