MURTAZA KHAN and 2 others vs Mst. DIL ARA NASRIN and 2 others

1. ' MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, C.J.--This appeal through leave of the Court, by plaintiffs in a suit for pre-emption, is directed against a Revisional judgment by the High Court.

2. ' The plaintiffs/appellants filed suit for pre-emption of land measuring 22 kanals. It was decreed for only 4 kanals and 4 marlas comprising of Khasra Nos.16, 18 and 19. The suit in respect of Khasra Nos.48/28 and 46/27 was dismissed. The plaintiffs' first appeal was partly allowed inasmuch as that sale price of the land decreed in their favour was reduced. Their right to pre-empt the sale regarding the remaining Khasra numbers was not recognized.

3. ' Two Civil Revisions were filed--one by the appellants/plaintiffs and the other by respondents/defendants. The appellants' Revision was allowed to the extent that they were held entitled to one more Khasra number; namely, 48/28. The respondents' Civil Revision was also allowed on the question of the price only. The appellants, not having been satisfied with regard to the remaining Khasra number; namely, 46/27, which it appears was the biggest piece of the sold land, sought leave to appeal which was granted to examine the following point:-- "That since the land comprised in Khasra No,46/27 is situate in the same block and is borne on the same Khata as Khasra Nos.16, 18 and 19, the petitioners (appellants) are entitled to seek pre-emption on the ground of vicinage in respect of this Khasra number also."

4. Learned counsel for the appellants in the very outset pointed out that since the grant of leave to appeal in this case, the Supreme Court has in a number of cases rejected the plea on which leave to appeal was granted. He himself cited Mukhtar v. Khakan and others (1983 SCM R 290), Haji Inayat Khan v. Murtaza Khan and others (1988 SCM R 1172) and Gulzada v. Muhammad Usman PLD 1990 Supreme Court 465. That being the latest position this appeal is dismissed but on account of the fairness shown by the learned counsel for the appellants, there shall be no order as to costs.

5. Before closing this order it needs to be mentioned that the learned counsel for the respondents/vendees prayed that despite the respondents having failed to obtain an order granting leave to appeal against the decision of the High Court, they are entitled to relief through cross-objections filed against the present appeal, which should be allowed and the decree passed in favour of the appellants should be set aside.

6. ' Leave to appeal having been refused to the respondents by a separate earlier order, the prayer made from the respondents' side if allowed will create confusion and might lead to conflicting results. Otherwise too we do not find any merit in the cross-objections. The same, accordingly, are dismissed.