PAKISTAN WATER AND POWER DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and another vs ALAM KHAN

ORDER

1. ' MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, C.J.--Leave to appeal has been sought by the WAPDA; against the dismissal by the High Court, of its Civil Revision. It had arisen out of a suit for recovery of money filed by the respondent/plaintiff which was decreed. Both the Appeal and Revision of the petitioners having been dismissed leave to appeal has now been sought.

2. ' The facts as briefly narrated by the learned counsel are that the respondent's tube well was connected with the petitioners' electricity supply. Cost of this connection was estimated and paid.

3. The connection was completed and the respondent started using the facility. Subsequently, however, audit party of the petitioners allegedly discovered short realisation of the connection charges due to, what has been stated to be, the additional supply of material for completing the connection more than what was originally estimated.

4. ' It has been held by the learned Courts below as a finding of fact that the petitioners have miserably failed to produce any evidence with regard to the additional expenditure, value of service even if quantified as money due to afore stated reasons. Reliance on mere report by their own auditors was obviously not enough.

5. ' Learned counsel realising the difficulty in this behalf argued only one point which was also pressed before the High Court; namely, that the Chairman WAPDA was sued in term by the respondent by filing a plaint against him and that the WAPDA itself being a necessary party was not impleaded till after the expiry of period of limitation, therefore, the respondent's suit was time- barred. The learned Judge in the High Court dealt with this question as follows:- "I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners. He has not assailed the findings of the learned Courts below on merits. The only contention pressed into service by him is that since the WAPDA was impleaded in the suit after the expiry of the limitation, the suit should have been dismissed on this ground. In support of this contention, he relies on section 22(1) of the Limitation Act which provides that: "Where, after the institution of a suit, a new plaintiff or defendant is substituted or added, the suit shall, as regards him, be deemed to have been instituted when he was so made a party."

6. ' The objection was raised before the learned lower appellate Court also but it repelled the same observing that no substitution or addition of a party had taken place in this case and only misdescription of one of the parties was rectified by an amendment. The cogency of this view is unassailable. It is manifest from the plaint that the relief had been sought against the WAPDA.

7. However, it was described as the Chairman, WAPDA instead of the WAPDA through the Chairman.

8. The description was corrected by an amendment. The Chairman is an integral part of the WAPDA and the two are not distinct and independent legal entities. It was, therefore, not a case of addition or substitution of a party and did not attract the provisions of section 22(1) of the Limitation Act ".

9. ' The reasoning of the learned Courts below which was upheld by the High Court in its Revisional jurisdiction has not been successfully assailed by the learned counsel. It has also statutory support.

10. Section 153 of the Civil Procedure Code reads as follows:-- "Section 153. General power to amend.---The Court may at any time, and on such terms as to costs or otherwise as it may think fit, amend any defect or error in any proceeding in a suit; and all necessary amendments shall be made for the purpose of determining the real question or issue raised by or depending on such proceeding."

11. ' The second part of the afore-noticed provision applies in this case. That being so it was the duty of the Court itself to make necessary correction in the plaint. It was thus a case of correction of the proceedings. There is no question of limitation involved. Leave to appeal, accordingly, is refused.