PEER MUHAMMAD SHAH vs SECRETARY TO THE BOARD OF REVENUE, PUNJAB, LAHORE And Another
The petitioner, a former driver for the Additional Commissioner (Consolidation), challenged his termination of service through a civil suit after his departmental appeal to the Board of Revenue failed. The trial court initially decreed in his favor, but the Additional District Judge set aside the decree, ruling that the civil court lacked jurisdiction and that the proper forum was the Service Tribunal. Subsequent revision proceedings in the High Court were unsuccessful. The petitioner then approached the Service Tribunal, which dismissed his appeal as time-barred. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued for the exclusion of time spent litigating in the civil court when computing the limitation period for the Service Tribunal appeal. The Supreme Court held that under Section 14 of the Limitation Act 1908, a party seeking exclusion of time must demonstrate that prior proceedings were prosecuted with due diligence and in good faith. As the Service Tribunal had already made a factual finding that these elements were absent, the Supreme Court declined to interfere with those findings and dismissed the petition.
- Can time spent in civil court proceedings be excluded when calculating the limitation period for an appeal before a Service Tribunal?
- Is a finding by a Service Tribunal regarding the lack of 'good faith' and 'due diligence' under Section 14 of the Limitation Act 1908 a question of fact that the Supreme Court will decline to interfere with?
- Section 14, Limitation Act 1908
ORDER
SAAD SAOOD JAN, J.---The petitioner was a driver in the office of the Additional Commissioner (Consolidation). For reason of unauthorised absence from duty his services were terminated by an Additional Commissioner. He preferred an appeal before the Board of Revenue but it failed. He then filed a civil suit to challenge the legality of the order of termination of his services. The suit was decreed by the trial Court. However, on appeal, the Additional District Judge set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court on the ground that the remedy of the petitioner lay before the Service Tribunal and that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction in the matter. The petitioner filed a revision petition in the High Court but that too failed. He then approached the Service Tribunal to seek relief.
The learned Tribunal dismissed his appeal on the ground that it was barred by time.
2. In support of this petition it is contended that the petitioner was entitled to the exclusion of the time which he spent in the Civil Court in computing limitation for the purpose of filing the appeal before the Service Tribunal. It is to be noticed that under Section 14, Limitation Act, the petitioner was required to show that he had prosecuted proceedings before the Civil Court with due diligence and in good faith. The learned Tribunal found that good faith and diligence were lacking in this case. These being findings of fact, we are not persuaded to interfere with them. The petition is dismissed.