FALAK SHER vs THE STATE
This matter involves a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court, which had previously dismissed the petitioner's application for the suspension of a seven-year sentence and a fine of Rs. 1,000 imposed under Section 304, Part II, Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court erred in refusing to suspend the petitioner's sentence, particularly given the petitioner's argument that the sentence was excessive and that a standard sentence in such cases should be three years. The Supreme Court held that the decision to suspend a sentence is a matter of judicial discretion. Finding that the High Court had exercised its discretion properly under the circumstances of the case, the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the lower court's order and dismissed the petition. The key principle laid down is that the suspension of a sentence pending appeal is a discretionary exercise by the High Court, and the Supreme Court will not interfere with such discretion unless it has been exercised improperly or arbitrarily.
- Is the suspension of a sentence pending appeal a matter of right or judicial discretion?
- Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's refusal to suspend a sentence?
- Section 304, Part II, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
ORDER
1. ' WAHEEDUDDIN J.-The petitioner has been sentenced for a period of seven years and to pay a fine of Rs, 1,000 under section 3u4, Part II, P. P. C. The petitioner applied for suspension of sentence in Criminal Appeal No, 715 of 1973, which was dismissed on the 16th March 1974. The petitioner seeks permission to file an appeal against the said order.
2. ' Ch. Abid Ali Buttar, learned Advocate-on-Record for the petitioner, has contended that the sentence awarded in this case is very excessive and for this reason the learned Single Judge of the High Court should have suspended the sentence. According to him, the normal sentence in such cases is three years. The contention of the learned counsel has not impressed us. We are not inclined to express any view whether in such cases normal sentence is three years. In our opinion, the question whether the sentence should have been suspended was a discretionary matter and in the circumstances of the case, the High Court has exercised the discretion properly. There is no ground to interfere. The petition is dismissed.