Pakistan Case Law
1991 PLD Supreme Court 780

WAPDA and 2 others vs Mian GHULAM BARI

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Citation1991 PLD Supreme Court 780
CourtSupreme Court of Pakistan
Case No.Civil Petition No,59-L of 1991 Civil Revision No,2489 of 1989
Date1991-04-28
Judge(s)Muhammad Rafique Tarar, Muhammad Afzal Zullah
Resultappeal refused
AI Summary — generated from this judgment; read the full text below and verify before relying on it.

This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by WAPDA against a High Court decision that affirmed the territorial jurisdiction of the Civil Court at Lahore to try a recovery suit against the corporation. The core legal question was whether WAPDA, as a statutory corporation, should be equated with the Government regarding territorial jurisdiction, and whether the explanation to Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C.) mandates that suits against WAPDA must be filed only where the cause of action arose, or if they can be filed at the location of its principal office. The Supreme Court held that the explanation to Section 20, C.P.C. provides two alternatives: a corporation is deemed to carry on business at its principal office, or at a subordinate office if the cause of action arose there. The use of the word 'or' signifies that the plaintiff has the option to sue at either location. Consequently, the Court rejected the petitioner's argument, affirming that the suit was maintainable at the principal office, and refused leave to appeal.

Questions settled in this judgment
  • Does the explanation to Section 20 of the C.P.C. allow a plaintiff to file a suit against a corporation at the location of its principal office even if the cause of action arose elsewhere?
  • Is WAPDA to be equated with the Government for the purpose of determining territorial jurisdiction in civil suits?
  • Does the word 'or' in the explanation to Section 20, C.P.C. create alternative forums for filing suits against corporations?
Laws & provisions referred
  • Order VII, Rule 10, C.P.C.
  • Section 20, C.P.C.
territorial jurisdictioncivil procedurecorporationcause of actionprincipal officestatutory interpretation

ORDER

1. ' MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, C.J.---WAPDA as defendant have sought leave to appeal in a suit for recovery; against the acceptance by the High Court of respondent/plaintiffs Civil Revision. The respondent's plaint was returned to him under Order VII, Rule 10, C.P.C. His appeal was dismissed but the Revision was accepted by the High Court on the finding that the Civil Court at Lahore had the requisite jurisdiction to try the suit. Accordingly, the respondent's Civil Revision was allowed and the case was sent to the said Civil Court for trial on merits.

2. ' Learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that WAPDA is not an ordinary Corporation. It should not be, therefore, equated with the other commercial institutions and further that it should be equated with the Government, vis-a-vis, the territorial jurisdiction of the Courts in the suits filed against it. While elaborating the argument he has contended that the explanation to section 20, C.P.C. Should be construed in such a manner so as to provide that in case a cause of action has actually arisen at the location of a Branch office of WAPDA, the suit should not be filed with reference to the principal office at Lahore. The explanation reads as follows:- "A corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its sole or principal office in Pakistan or, in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office, at such place." ##TS# It is true that in the second part of the explanation a scope has been left 1 for filing of the suit at a place where a corporation has a subordinate office provided any cause of action arose at that place. But this part of explanation is preceded by another alternative; namely, that a corporation shall be deemed to carry on a business at its sole or principal office. The use of the word "or" between the two is very significant. It means that the corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its sole or principal office as well as at any place where it has a subordinate office but in the latter case the cause of action should have arisen at that place. Thus the argument of the learned counsel being too wide to be accepted and the same also being in negation of the statutory explanation, has no force. Leave to appeal, accordingly, is refused.

3. Leave to .

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