GHULAM MURTAZA vs THE STATE
This matter concerns eight petitions for leave to appeal against the enhancement of sentences by the Peshawar High Court. The petitioners, public servants and a private drug store owner, had pleaded guilty to submitting bogus medical reimbursement claims, for which the trial court initially imposed lenient sentences of imprisonment until the rising of the court. Upon the District Magistrate's motion, the High Court enhanced these sentences to six months' rigorous imprisonment. The core legal questions were whether the sentences were excessive given the protracted trial duration and whether a Single Judge of the High Court possessed the jurisdiction to enhance sentences. The Supreme Court held that the sentences were not excessive, noting the alarming prevalence of such corruption and the resulting loss to the public exchequer. Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument that a Single Judge lacked the authority to enhance sentences, finding no statutory rule or provision prohibiting such an order in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction. The petitions were dismissed, affirming that the High Court's discretion in sentencing matters, when exercised reasonably, is generally not subject to interference.
- Can a Single Judge of the High Court enhance a sentence in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction?
- Is a sentence of imprisonment until the rising of the court appropriate for corruption offenses involving public funds?
- Does the length of a trial and the threat of job loss justify a lenient sentence for corruption-related offenses?
- Section 5(2), Prevention of Corruption Act 1947
- Section 409, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 439, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898
ORDER
' MUHAMMAD APZAL CHEEMA, J.-These eight petitions for leave to appeal, Nod. 27-P to 34-P of 1974 are connected matters having a common background and involving the same question for determination. Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 27-P to 30-P were public servants employed in different Departments of the Provincial Government of the N.-W. F.P. Who submitted bogus claims for reimbursement of medical charges, were tried by the Special Judge (Provincial), pleaded guilty and prayed for mercy of the Court. In Petitions No, 31-P to 34-P, Asadullah petitioner who ran a drug store was sent up as an abettor with the other petitioners and also pleaded guilty.
2. The learned Special Judge taking a lenient view sentenced the petitioners to imprisonment till the rising of the Court in addition to minor sentences of tine under section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act/ 409, P. P. C.
3. Since these mal-practices had assumed phenomenal proportions and notoriety of a racket, the District Magistrate, Peshawar, moved the High Court for the enhancement of sentences under section 439, Cr. P. C. The learned Single Judge allowed the revision petitions and vide his stereotyped orders of even date, enhanced the sentences of imprisonment to six months' R.I. In each case. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners have moved these petitions.
4. In support of the petitions, learned counsel contended before us that having regard to the fact that the petitioners had to face the agony of protracted investigation and trial lasting for five years from 1968 to 1973 with the threat of loss of job or business into the bargain, a charitable view in the matter of award of sentence was justified as taken by the trial Judge whose persuasive suggestion, according to the instructions of the learned counsel, prevailed upon the petitioners to plead guilty.
We are not impressed by this contention which is not based on a point of law. Even otherwise, the alarming proportioned assumed by this modus operandi widely indulged in by Government servants resulting in colossal loss to the public exchequer bedsides damage to the moral fiber of the Nation, which led to the abolition of the age old procedure by the Government, we are not inclined to think that the sentences awarded by the High Court in exercise of it discretion not usually open to challenge in this Court, are in any manner excessive.
5. Learned counsel next contended on the basis of PLD 1956 Kar. 476, that although a notice for enhancement of sentence could be issued by a Single Judge, the decision for enhancement could only be taken by a Division Bench according to the High Court Rules and Procedure. Learned counsel could not produce before us any rule to this effect. There is nothing to show that an order of enhancement made by a learned Single Judge of the High Court in exercise of his provisional jurisdiction is violative of any statutory provision so as to be rendered invalid. The petitions have no force and are hereby dismissed.
Cited by 1 case
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