Mst. MAHMOODA BEGUM and anothers vs TAJ DIN

' RUSTAM S. SIDHWA, J.---This is an appeal preferred by Mst. Mahmooda Begum and another, appellants, against the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, dated 15-12- 1981, accepting the Writ Petition of Taj Din, respondent, and setting aside the judgment of a learned Additional District Judge of Lahore, dated 17-7-1980, accepting the appeal of the appellants and setting aside the eviction order passed by a learned Rent Controller of Lahore in favour of the respondent on 30-4-1978.

2. The brief facts of the case are that Taj Din, landlord, filed a petition against Mst. Mahmooda Begum and another, tenants, seeking their ejectment from House No,66, Abkari Road, near Law College, Lahore. The landlord claimed to be transferee since 28-3-1960. The contention of the landlord was that Qasim Ali, husband of Mst. Mahmooda Begum was tenant of two rooms on the ground floor, vide rent deed, dated 3-5-1962, which had been executed in favour of Qutab Din, the father of Taj Din. After the death of Qasim Ali, Mst. Mahmooda Begum continued as tenant on a rent of Rs,15 per mensem. The house was in a dilapidated condition and the landlord started its repairs and thus the tenant shifted to another portion of the same building temporarily, on the understanding that she would come back to her old tenement after repairs. It is the case of the landlord that the premises were in a dilapidated condition and he wanted to reconstruct the same.

He also contended that the tenant had commited default in payment of rent from 1-9-1971 to August, 1972. He therefore filed an ejectment petition.

3. The ejectment petition was contested by the tenant and the learned Rent Controller framed the following issues:---

(1) Whether the tenants have paid or tendered the rent of the disputed premises in time to the landlord?

(2) Whether the disputed premises are required by the landlord for reconstruction in good faith and the landlord has obtained the necessary sanction from Lahore Municipal Corporation?

(3) What is the actual rate of rent of the disputed premises?

(4) Whether the tenant. No,2, is entitled to a notice under sec ion 30 of Displaced Persons Act, 1958?

(5) Whether the tenants are entilted to notice under section 13-A of Rent Restriction Ordinance?

(6) Relief.

4. The learned Rent Controller held issues Nos. 1 and 2 in favour of the landlord and on issue No,3 he held that the rate of rent was Rs,15 p.m. Issues Nos. 4 and 5 were also held in favour of the landlord and as a result of this, ejectment order was passed against the tenants.

5. Feeling aggrieved by the above order, the tenants preferred an appeal before the District Judge, Lahore. The learned Additional District Judge, who heard the appeal, held issues Nos. 1 to 5 in favour of the tenants and by his, judgment, dated 17-7-1980, he accepted the appeal and set aside the order of the learned Rent Controller, dated 30-4-1978.

6. Feeling aggrieved by the appellate judgment, Taj Din, landlord filed a Writ Petition No,W.P. 11719/80 before the Lahore High Court, Lahore. There the respondent contended that:

(i) Notice under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (C&R) Act, 1958 was not a requirement in this case.

(ii) Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 were in the circumstances of the case not entitled to notice under section 13-A of the Ordinance.

(iii) The effect of repeal of the settlement laws has not received its weight.

(iv) Issue of construction has not been decided in accordance with law.

' The learned Judge, instead of arriving at any definite findings on the above contentions or on the question whether the judgment of the appellate Judge suffered from a misreading or misappreciation of the evidence, or failed to take into consideration material facts for arriving at any of its findings, or had failed to apply any proper principle or rule of law, merely discussed certain rulings cited on behalf of the tenants and held that the appellate judgment lacked the proper legal exposition on the issues, that the law declared by the superior Courts was meant to be observed and applied, which the appellate Court had not done, and that therefore the judgment cannot be stated as having been passed with lawful authority and he, therefore, set aside the appellate judgment and remanded the case for fresh decision, in the light of the relevant decisions delivered by the superior Courts governing, the points which were directly or indirectly in issue in the case.

7. The tenants being aggrieved by the above judgment are now in appeal before us. On behalf of the appellants/tenants it is submitted that the learned Single Judge not having arrived at any direct conclusion about any misreading of the evidence on the part of the appellate Judge, or failure by him to apply' any proper principle or rule of law, he could not have interfered with the findings arrived at by the appellate Judge. The mere fact that the learned Judge of the High Court noted a large number of authorities of his own and other High Courts and of the Supreme Court which had not been taken into consideration by the appellate Judge, was not enough to remand the case. It is lastly submitted that the findings of the appellate Judge being based on a proper appraisal of the facts of the case and the law on the subject, deserve to be restored.

8. On behalf of the respondent/landlord it is submitted that the findings of the learned appellate Judge on issues Nos. 1 to 5 were based -on a total misappreciation and misreading of the evidence and that his findings on issues Nos. 4 and 5 in paritcular were in total violation of the law. It is submitted that the respondent was seeking the eviction of the appellants from premises which did not enjoy statutory protection, as in 1971, under mutual arrangement arrived at between the parties, the appellants had shifted to the present tenement to enable the respondent to repair the original tenement, which actually enjoyed the statutory protection. In these circumstances, it is submitted that the appellants were not entitled to receive any notice under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. It is further submitted that the appellants having continued to pay rents uptill September, 1971, were not entitled to any notice under section 13-A of, the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, after the death of Qutab Din, the father of the respondent. In these circumstances, it is submitted, that the order of the learned Single Judge of the High Court should be allowed to stand.

9. With the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties we have gone through the record, in the light of the arugments addressed by them. In normal circumstances, the High Court is not supposed to interfere with a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal of special jurisdiction in respect of matters exclusively within its competence, unless there has been a serious misreading or misappreciation of the evidence on the part of the said tribunal, or there has been failure on its part to take into consideration material facts or to apply the statutory law or any principle or rule of law as laid down by the superior Courts. It is not enough for the High Court to merely find that a large number of decisions of the superior Courts covering contentions which were raised before it were not so considered and thus set aside the judgment and remand the case for fresh decision, in the light of relevant decisions delivered by the superior Courts governing the points which are directly or indirectly in issue in the case. It is necessary for the High Court to first identify in respect of which matters it wishes to interfere with findings of fact or law arrived at by tribunals of special jurisdiction. Since the High Court has not carried out its duty, with great reluctance we have no alternative but to set aside the impugned decision of the learned Single Judge and to remand the case back to the High Court for redetermination of the question whether any principle on which the High Court normally interferes with findings of fact or law recorded, by tribunals of special jurisdiction, stands made out in the case and, if so, whether the appellate judgment deserves to be set aside or the for redetermination of any matter.

10. For the foregoing reasons, this appeal is accepted, the decision of the learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, dated 15-12-1981 is set aside and the case is remanded to the High Court for the purpose of determining whether principles on which the High Court normally interferes with findings of fact or law recorded by tribunals of special jurisiction, in respect of matter falling within their exclusive jurisdiction, stand made out in this case and, if so, whether the appellate judgment deserves to be set aside or the respondent's appeal deserves to be remanded for any fresh decision on any matter or matters which the High Court considers fit and proper.

11. There shall be no order as to costs.

12. The parties shall appear before the Lahore High Court on 12th April, 1990. .