MESSRS PAKISTAN RUBBER PRODUCTS vs JOINT SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN AND ANOTHER
This matter arises from an office objection that a petition for special leave to appeal was barred by 432 days. The High Court delivered its judgment on 31st October 1972, and a review petition filed on 7th November 1972 was dismissed on 11th February 1974. The petition for special leave to appeal was subsequently filed on 7th March 1974. The core legal question concerns whether the limitation period for filing a petition for special leave to appeal starts afresh from the date of the dismissal of a review petition or whether only the time spent pursuing the review can be excluded, and whether an unexplained delay after the dismissal of the review warrants condonation. The Supreme Court held that the limitation period does not start afresh from the date of the review order; at best, the time spent pursuing the review may be excluded, but an unexcused delay between the dismissal of the review and the filing of the petition remains fatal. The petition was accordingly dismissed as time-barred.
- Does the time for filing a petition for special leave to appeal start running afresh from the date of the order dismissing a review petition?
- Can the time spent in pursuing a review petition be excluded for the purpose of condoning delay in filing a petition for special leave to appeal?
ORDER
1. ' WAHEEDUDDI AHMAD, J.-The office objection is that the petition is barred by 432 days. The High Court in this case, delivered the judgment on the 31st October 1972. The petitioner moved an application for review of this judgment in the High Court on the 7th November 1972. The Review petition was dismissed on the 11th February 1974. The petition for special leave to appeal was filed on the 7th March 1974.
2. The explanation of the petitioner is that the original order passed by the High Court on the 31st October 1972, was substituted by an order of the review petition dated the 11th February 1974, and the time for filing the petition for special leave to appeal started running from the 11th February 1974. The explanation of the petitioner is not satisfactory. The utmost the petitioner can demand is that the time taken by him in pursuing the remedy of review petition should be taken into consideration for condo nation of delay. We are inclined to exclude the time taken in pursuing the review petition, but there is no explanation why the petition was filed on the 7th March 1974. The petitioner should have filed the petition for special leave to appeal immediately after the 11th February 1974. This being so, the petition is barred by time and is dismissed accordingly. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.