Pakistan Case Law
1975 SCMR 175

MIR AND ANOTHER vs THE STATE

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Citation1975 SCMR 175
CourtSupreme Court of Pakistan
Case No.Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No, K-19 of 1974
Date1974-09-04
Judge(s)Waheeduddin Ahmed and Muhammad Gul
Authored byWaheeduddin Ahmed
ResultPetition dismissed
AI Summary — generated from this judgment; read the full text below and verify before relying on it.

This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against an order of the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan, Karachi, whereby the petitioners' application for suspension of sentence under section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 was rejected, while their co-accused was admitted to bail. The core legal question concerns whether the High Court's brief order refusing to suspend the petitioners' sentence was legally deficient for want of reasons and whether the Supreme Court should interfere with such discretionary orders. The Supreme Court held that although the order was brief, the High Court had applied its mind and exercised its discretion, and since the matter of suspending a sentence is discretionary, it is not open to challenge before the Supreme Court absent compelling grounds. The petition was accordingly dismissed. The key principle laid down is that a brief order by the High Court refusing bail or suspension of sentence under section 426, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, does not warrant Supreme Court interference where it reflects application of mind and exercise of judicial discretion.

Questions settled in this judgment
  • Whether an order of the High Court refusing to suspend a sentence under section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 is open to interference by the Supreme Court when it is brief?
  • Does a brief order rejecting an application for suspension of sentence necessarily render it a non-speaking order if judicial mind is applied?
  • Is the matter of suspending a sentence pending appeal under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 discretionary?
Laws & provisions referred
  • Section 326, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
  • Section 324, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
  • Section 34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
  • Section 426, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898
suspension of sentencecriminal appealdiscretionary orderbail after convictionspeaking orderSupreme Court interference

ORDER

1. ' WAHEEDUDDIN Ahmad J.-The petitioners, alongwith two others, namely, Waryam and Ramzan were committed to the Court of Session at Nawabshah by the Resident Magistrate, Moro, to stand their trial under sections 326, 324/34, P. P. C. On the 22nd May, 1971. The petitioners were convicted by the learned trial Judge under section 326 read with section 34, P. P. C. And were sentenced to 8 years' R. 1 each. They were also sentenced to pay fine of Rs, 1,000 each. The petitioners and their co- accused filed an appeal in the High Court of Sind & Baluchistan, Karachi. Alongwith the appeal, they moved an application under, section 426, Cr. P. C. For the suspension of the sentence. The appeal was admitted by a learned Single Judge and notice was issued on the application under section 426 Cr. P. C. To the State counsel. The application was heard by a learned Single Judge on the 12th December, 1973 and the petitioners' application for suspension of sentence was rejected but the co-accused was admitted to bail. The petitioners seek permission to file an appeal against the said order.

2. Mr. M. I. Memon, learned Advocate-on-Record, has contended that the order of the learned Single Judge dated the 12th December, 1973 gives no reason for rejecting the application of the petitioners under section 426, Cr. P. C. According to him, it is not a speaking order. We have gone through the order. It is a brief one. We are, however, satisfied that the High Court has applied its mind and exercised the discretion against 4 the petitioners. The question being discretionary is not open to challenge In this Court. We, therefore, do not consider this a tit case for interference. The petition is dismissed.

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