KAMAL KHAN vs THE STATE
This criminal appeal arose from a conviction for murder under the Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Ordinance, 1990, where the appellant was sentenced to death. The core legal question was whether, given the evidence of a sudden altercation and grappling, the sentence of death should be commuted to life imprisonment, or if the circumstances warranted the extreme penalty. The appellant argued that the incident was a sudden flare-up, potentially falling under Exception 4 to Section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, and thus merited a lesser sentence. The Supreme Court held that the nature of the injuries—three dagger blows inflicted on an empty-handed victim—demonstrated a cruel manner of killing, ruling out any justification for leniency. The Court affirmed that once a murder charge is proven, death is the normal penalty, and appellate interference is not warranted where the violence is excessive and directed at vital parts of the body. The appeal was dismissed, maintaining the death sentence.
- Is death the normal penalty for a proven charge of murder under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860?
- Does the infliction of multiple dagger blows on an empty-handed victim preclude the mitigation of a death sentence?
- Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with a death sentence awarded by a trial court and affirmed by the High Court?
- Section 302(b), Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Ordinance 1990
- Section 300, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 304, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
1. ' MANZOOR HUSSAIN SIAL, J.---The learned Sessions Judge, Sibi, on 31-3-1992, convicted Kamal Khan under section 302(b) of Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Ordinance, 1990, for the murder of Ghulam Sarwar alias Kalu and sentenced him to death. The conviction as well as sentence awarded to him was confirmed by the Balochistan High Court on 8-5-1992 and in consequence his appeal stood dismissed. Kamal Khan assailed the aforesaid order of the High Court through petition for leave to appeal in this Court. Learned counsel for the convict pressed only the question of sentence and leave was granted by order dated 4-4-1993 which reads as follows:-- "In this case of conviction for murder with sentence of death, the learned counsel has pressed only the question of sentence. He has relied upon the confessional statement as well as the deposition by a solitary eye-witness in order to show that there were harsh words exchanged between the deceased and the petitioner. They were followed by a grappling, and then, there is also a mention of a fight between them for 2/3 minutes, in the cross-examination of the eyewitness. He further explained that he was unable to hear the conversation between the accused and the deceased before they started exchanging harsh words.
2. ' According to the learned counsel, these are all such elements as can be noticed and relied upon for bringing the case within the ambit of Exception 4 to section 300, P.P.C. And resultant conviction only under section 304, Part I, P.P.C. But he candidly admitted that there are some other elements in this case, for example, the infliction of three dagger blows by the petitioner on the deceased who was empty-handed. Therefore, this case would not fall within the exact four corners of Exception 4.
3. But as held by this Court in some cases, the convict can be granted the benefit of reduction of sentence.
4. ' The argument advanced by the learned counsel has the support of some decided cases. He will furnish the list of such cases later on.
5. ' Leave to appeal accordingly is granted on the question of sentence only."
6. ' Learned counsel for the convict appellant contended that it is in the statement of the complainant that harsh words were exchanged between the deceased and the appellant followed by grappling and fight which took place for 2/3 minutes before the appellant inflicted dagger injuries to Ghulam Sarwar deceased. It was also submitted that the complainant was unable to hear the hot words exchanged between the appellant and deceased. Learned counsel further contended that there is nothing on record to indicate that the appellant was aware that the deceased would meet him at the relevant time at the place of occurrence. According to him, it was sudden flare up and cannot be said with certainty as to who gave provocation resulting in the unfortunate incident. Learned counsel strenuously argued that the peculiar circumstances of this case do not call for imposition of extreme penalty. He relied on Safdar Ali v. Crown (PLD 1953 FC 93) and Shahid Hussain v. The State (1983 SCM R 201 (204) in support of his submission.
7. ' Learned Advocate-General, opposed the appeal and contended that the appellant acted in most cruel manner by inflicting dagger blows on the deceased. It was submitted that the murder charge stood established against the appellant therefore, normal penalty of death was rightly awarded by the trial Court and duly affirmed by the High Court. It was argued that this Court ordinarily does not interfere in the award of legal penalty particularly when the murder charge stands proved against the assailant. He relied on Khadim Hussain v. The State (1980 SCM R 342) and Ahmad and others v.
8. The State (PLD 1971 SC 720) in support of his contentions.
9. ' After examining the record and hearing learned counsel for the parties we are of the view, that there is no room for interference in the sentence awarded to the appellant. The nature of the three injuries inflicted by the appellant on the deceased with dagger, having 8 inches blade, shows that the appellant murdered Ghulam Sarwar in cruel manner when he was empty-handed and at the mercy of the appellant.
10. ' The nature and locale of the injuries caused by the appellant with deadly weapon, to the deceased rule out any justification for imposing alternate penalty. Furthermore we find substantial force in the submission of the learned Advocate-General that once the charge of murder is proved the award of death is a normal penalty and this Court ordinarily does not interfere with a legal C penalty awarded to the convict. The case entitled Shahid v. The State (1983 SCM R 201(204), cited by the learned counsel for appellant, is distinguishable inasmuch as that there was only one fireshot attributed to the convict in that case, but in the instant case, the appellant gave three dagger blows, one of which landed in the chest of the deceased and the other blows also on the vital part of his body.
11. In our opinion, this is not a fit case for interference in the award of D normal penalty of death to the convict by the learned trial Judge and affirmed by the High Court.
12. ' Resultantly we find no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly dismissed.