MUHAMMAD DIN vs MEHBOOB KHAN and 3 others
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which upheld the dismissal of a pre-emption suit. The petitioner had initially obtained a court order directing a deposit based on a sale price of Rs. 5,000 under Section 24 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987. Subsequently, the trial court, upon realizing the actual sale price was Rs. 80,000 and that the initial order was procured through fraud and misrepresentation, directed the petitioner to deposit the correct amount. The core legal question was whether the trial court could issue a revised deposit order beyond the 30-day period stipulated in the first proviso to Section 24 of the Act. The Supreme Court held that the court is under an obligation to recall an order obtained through fraud. It further clarified that the 30-day limit does not preclude the court from correcting orders obtained by misrepresentation, especially when the initial order was passed subject to the respondents' objections. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, affirming that the court retains the inherent power to rectify fraudulent proceedings.
- Can a court recall an order regarding the deposit of sale price in a pre-emption suit if that order was obtained through fraud?
- Does the 30-day limitation period under the first proviso to Section 24 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987, prevent a court from correcting an order procured by misrepresentation?
- Is an order for the deposit of sale price passed in the absence of the respondents subject to subsequent objections regarding the actual sale price?
- Section 24, N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987
' MUHAMMAD AFZAL LONE, J---In a pre-emption suit fileld by Muhammad Din petitioner against the respondents, the learned trial Court treating the sale price of the land in dispute as Rs, 5,000, in pursuance of the provisions of section 24 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987, by order dated 16- 10-1989, directed the petitioner to deposit 1/3rd of the said amount in the Court and furnish bank guarantee to cover the remaining 2/3rd thereof. The respondents applied to the trial Court that the land was actually sold to them for Rs,80,000 and, therefore , the petitioner was required to make deposit in the Court on the basis of the said sale price. This contention prevalied with the learned trial Court. Accordingly, through a detailed order dated 15-1-1990 a direction was given to the petitioner to deposit 1/3rd of Rs,80,000 in the Court and arrange bank guarantee in respect of 2/3rd of the said amount. The petitioner assailed this order in appeal before the Distict Judge, who held that the petitioner procured order dated 16-10-1989 as to the deposit of sale amount on the footing of sale price of Rs,5,000 by fraud and misrepresentation, and, the trial Court was duty bound to undo the fraud. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. This dismissal was challenged by the petitioner through writ petition, but the learned Single Judge of the Abbottabad Bench of the Pershawar High Court did not differ with the findings recorded by the learned District Judge.
Consequently, the writ petition failed. The High Court's judgment dated 6-104992 in this behalf is under challenge before us; from which leave to appeal is sought by the unsuccessful pre-emptor.
2. We have heard the learned counsel. The only submission made by him is that under the first proviso to section 24 the deposit has to be made in the Court within 30 days of the filing of the suit.
In his submission the order of the Court requiring the pre-emptor to make deposit has necessarily to be made within said period of 30 days. The argument was that order dated 15-1-1990 having been made beyond this limit could not be sustained.
3. We are unable to lend any weight to the submission of the learned counsel. The first proviso fixes the outer limit of time for the pre-emptor. The order as to the deposit of sale price in the Court having been made in the absence of the respondents would be presumed to hive been passed subject to their objection. In any case, the order having been obtained by the petitioner by practicing fraud on the Court, the latter was under obligation to recall the same the grant of leave is within the discretion of the Court. Upon the facts of the case, we do not consider it a fit case for grant of leave. Accordingly, this petition is dismissed and the leave prayed for refused.
Cited by 1 case
- ASFANDYAR KHAN Versus GHAZANFAR ALI 2011 MLD 466