MUHAMMAD YASIN and 2 others vs Ch. MUHAMMAD ABDUL AZIZ

1. ' MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, C.J.--This direct appeal on the acceptance of the respondent/plaintiff's Civil Miscellaneous appeal by the Balochistan High Court raises a question regarding territorial jurisdiction of the Civil Courts at Quetta.

2. ' As stated in the impugned judgment the respondent had filed a suit for recovery of about 1-1/2 lacs as price of coal supply to the appellants. It was pending before a learned Additional District Judge, Quetta when the plaint was returned to the respondent to be presented before a competent Court of jurisdiction. Courts at Quetta, it was said, had no territorial jurisdiction. The coal was to be supplied at Faisalabad, therefore, it was thought that the Faisalabad Courts (Punjab) had the territorial jurisdiction. On appeal before the High Court after noticing sub-clause (c) of section 20, C.P.C. To the effect that a Civil Court where cause of action whole or in part arises, shall also have jurisdiction to try a suit, it was observed as follows:- "It is clear that as per section 20(c) a suit is to be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the cause of action wholly or in part arose hence the only question which is very pertinent is whether any cause of action as a whole or in part accrued to the plaintiff at. Quetta in the case in hand?... ...

3. ' It is an admitted fact that the plaintiff who is resident of Quetta and has his business at Quetta reached an agreement with the defendants who are residents of Faisalabad for supplying them coal. There is also no dispute that coal used to be despatched through a Goods Company at Quetta to Faisalabad and after receiving the same payment had to be made. ... 'there would hardly be any difficulty in concluding that at least part of cause of action accrued at Quetta."

4. ' Learned counsel has admitted the simple crucial fact in this case to determine the territorial jurisdiction, that in reality the coal supply at Quetta was to be dispatched further to Faisalabad.

5. Without the proof of this supply at Quetta learned counsel further agreed the respondent/plaintiff could not have succeeded in the suit.

6. The bundle of essential facts which comprises the cause of action in this case amongst other elements relating to Quetta, undoubtedly contains the most essential pivotal element of the supply of coal at Quetta from where it was to be despatched to Faisalabad. The element of place of agreement also is relevant as an essential part of the bundle of facts. But the question of supply being very important in the context of entire circumstances of this case, the same is also a very essential fact. We, do agree with the learned counsel for the appellants that receipt of coal at Faisalabad is an important element in the transaction and the trial of the suit in that behalf but that also is one single element. It will also be treated as an essential fact amongst the other facts constituting bundle of essential facts, as forming the cause of action. Thus, a part of cause at least arose, at Quetta also.

7. ' In the light of the foregoing discussion we have not been able to find any infirmity in the impugned judgment of the High Court, legal or otherwise. This appeal, therefore, is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.