Rao AKHTAR ALAM and anothers vs JAVED IQBAL and 2 others
This appeal arises from a suit for specific performance where the trial court initially disallowed an application to amend the plaint to implead subsequent vendees. The Additional District Judge subsequently allowed the amendment in revision, a decision upheld after the appellants challenged it through successive writ petitions. The appellants approached the Supreme Court, contending that the Additional District Judge lacked pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the revision petition. The core legal question was whether the appellants, as subsequent vendees, could challenge the amendment of the plaint on the grounds of pecuniary jurisdiction when they were being impleaded as necessary parties to the ongoing litigation. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the objection regarding pecuniary jurisdiction was not raised before the lower forum. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the appellants should welcome the opportunity to be impleaded in the suit to defend their rights, noting that failing to do so would expose them to the doctrine of lis pendens. The judgment reinforces that procedural objections regarding jurisdiction should be raised at the earliest opportunity and that impleading subsequent vendees in specific performance suits is legally appropriate.
- Can a party challenge the pecuniary jurisdiction of a court for the first time in appeal when the point was not raised before the lower forum?
- Is it appropriate to allow the amendment of a plaint to implead subsequent vendees in a suit for specific performance?
- What is the consequence for subsequent vendees who fail to defend their rights in a pending suit for specific performance?
- Order VI Rule 17, Code of Civil Procedure 1908
' ABDUL SHAKURUL SALAM, J.---This appeal by leave arises in the following circumstances.
1. Respondent No.1 Javid Iqbal filed a suit for specific performance. An application under Order VI, Rule 17, C.P.C. Was filed for permission to amend the plaint impleading the subsequent vendees, the appellants. It was disallowed by the learned trial Court on 8-9-1982. The respondents filed a revision petition. The learned Additional District Judge accepted the same ex parte and allowed the respondents to amend the plaint. The appellants challenged the order of the learned Additional District Judge through Writ Petition No.466 before the Lahore High Court which was disposed of with the observations that the grounds taken in the writ petition may be agitated before the Additional District Judge. The appellants did so. The learned Additional District Judge upheld his previous order. The appellants filed a fresh Writ Petition No.3264 of 1983 in the Lahore High Court which has been dismissed by a learned Judge on 24-1-1989. Hence the appeal.
2. Contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the learned Additional District Judge did not have pecuniary jurisdiction at the relevant time.
3. Not only the point was never taken before the learned Additional District Judge but what the learned Additional District Judge has done is to allow the respondents to amend the plaint to implead the appellants who are subsequent vendees of the property in dispute in respect of which the suit for specific performance is pending. Instead of objecting to being impleaded and heard, the appellants should welcome the opportunity to defend their rights otherwise they might be hit by doctrine of lis pendens.
4. In view of what has been stated above, we find no merits in this appeal. It is, therefore, dismissed.