Syed FAQIR HUSSAIN SHAH BOKHARI vs Mst. ASMAT BIBI and others

1. ' This appeal under Order XLIII, rule 1(u) of Civil,P.C. Was against an order of remand by learned Judge below for re-determining issue No,2, regarding proper valuation of the suit for purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction. Findings on other issues were not touched.

2. ' Dispute between the parties concerned a piece of evacuee property with some constructions existing on it. Plaintiffs claimed its transfer and filed a suit for its possession against the respondents. They denied their claim and set up title to the property in them on the basis of its transfer in their favour. Valuable constructions were shown to have been made on it by them. Suit was tried on number of issues, numbering as many as twelve. These included an issue concerning correct valuation of the suit for purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction. It reads as:-- "Whether the suit is not correctly valued for pusposes of court-fee and jurisdiction? If so what is the correct valuation and its effect? OPD"

3. ' It may be observed that the plaint assessed the value for purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction of the property in dispute on the basis of its market value at Rs,33,250. Upon evidence, the trial Court found that the assessed valuation was incorrect and called upon the plaintiffs to correct the suit valuation "in accordance with the prevalent rates of the market". It omitted to decide the actual valuation of the suit for purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction. Virtually, the later part of the issue was left undecided by the trial Court. The suit, however, was dismissed, on 24th November, 1984.

4. Upon the valuation given in the plaint, plaintiffs preferred an appeal in the District Court culminating in the remand order on the line indicated above. Aggrieved of it, the plaintiffs preferred an appeal to this Court. It was admitted to hearing on 2-7-1986.

5. ' At the hearing, it was asserted by the appellants that since they merely claimed possession of land and laid no claim to the buildings on it, therefore, the jurisdiction of the Court and the amount of court-fee stamp payable upon the plaint were determinable by its market value, irrespective of the buildings. Durga Das and others v. Nihal Chand and others AIR 1928 Lahore 852 by Jai Lal, J. Was relied upon to support the above contention. In this case, it was observed:-- "In my opinion the view of the Courts below is erroneous. In a suit like the present, it is the market value of the land that determines the jurisdiction of the Court, and the amount of court-fee stamp payable on the plaint is also to be calculated on the same. So far as the buildings are concerned, the plaintiffs are entitled to ignore them leaving it to the defendant to remove them or to claim such remedy as he may be advised to claim in respect thereof. Their claim is for possession of the land and not of the building with the land. The market value of the land is to be determined under the provisions of the Court Fees Act and the Suits Valuation Act having regard to its nature at the time of the institution of the suit, irrespective of the buildings. The respondents' counsel concedes that this is the correct view of the matter."

6. ' Since, I was not prone to finally decide on the value of the suit for purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction by leaving it to the lower Court, it was unnecessary to further comment on it. There was no complaint on either side regarding insufficiency of material on record for final determination of the issue respecting valuation for purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction. Therefore, remand to the trial Court for decision of a limb' of an issue which could have been resolved finally in appellate jurisdiction was inexpedient and wholly unnecessary. The suit was instituted on 10-10-1977, and, was not yet near the fmal decision. Meanwhile, years have rolled by. The question regarding payability of court-fee on the plaint and determination of the value for purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction was not much difficult to decide in a short span of time. For purposes of decision of the above issue, an open remand for entailing another round of litigation was neither called for nor was it necessary in the interests of law and justice. At one time, I was inclined to convert impugned remand order into a limited remand under Order 41, rule 25, Civil P.C. But upon reflection, I dropped the idea by trusting the appellate Court for giving a decision on it to achieve quicker result.

7. Unnecessary remands entail delay in the decision and also consume much valuable public time and expense of the parties. Therefore, this practice unless found inevitably necessary was deprecated in various pronouncements by the superior Courts. Unless found in cul-de-sac, remand met with little approval from me. An effort for final decision of the controversy in appellate or revisional jurisdiction was much conducive to quicker administration of justice to the parties locked in it. That was the need of the time and call of the day. Courts must favourably respond to it for avoiding despondency in the litigant parties. It was for this reason that I decided to set aside the impugned order of remand. Upon this view of the matter, appeal is allowed, impugned order dated 13-4-1986 of learned District Judge, Faisalabad, is set aside and the case is sent back to him to decide issue No,2 himself, alongwith other issues on merits, in accordance with law. If considered necessary, it shall be open to learned District Judge to take up issue No,2 first for decision prior to his examination of other issues on merits. There shall be no order as to its costs in this Court. Parties shall appear before learned District Judge, Faisalabad, on 24-4-1993. An effort shall be made to decide the appeal within six to nine months.