WATER AND POWER DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs ZAHOOR AHMED
This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) challenging a Federal Service Tribunal judgment that converted the respondent's removal from service into compulsory retirement. The respondent, a Line Superintendent-1, had been removed under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act. WAPDA contended that the Tribunal erred regarding the limitation period and lacked the authority to substitute the penalty of removal with compulsory retirement. The Supreme Court rejected the limitation argument, noting that the Tribunal possessed the jurisdiction to condone delay, a matter generally not re-examined by the Supreme Court. Regarding the substitution of penalty, the Court relied on established precedents (WAPDA v. Abdul Sattar and Aijaz Nabi Abbasi v. WAPDA), affirming that the Tribunal, as an appellate forum, has the power to examine the appropriateness of the penalty and substitute the Authority's order with a more suitable one if deemed necessary. Consequently, the Court held that the Tribunal acted within its legal competence, and leave to appeal was refused.
- Does the Federal Service Tribunal have the jurisdiction to substitute an order of removal from service with an order of compulsory retirement?
- Can the Supreme Court interfere with the Federal Service Tribunal's decision to condone a delay in filing an appeal?
- Does the Federal Service Tribunal have the authority to examine the appropriateness of a penalty imposed by the WAPDA under Section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act?
- Section 17(1-A), WAPDA Act 1958
ORDER
AJMAL MIAN, J.---This is a petition for leave to appeal filed by WAPDA against the judgment dated 31-1-1993 passed by the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad, hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal in Appeal No.1(Q)/1984, filed by the respondent, who was acting as the Line Superintendent-1 at the relevant time against the order of his removal from service under section 17(1-A) of the WAPDA Act, allowing the same partly by converting the order of removal into compulsory retirement. The WAPDA has, therefore, filed the present petition for leave to appeal.
2. In support of the above petition, Ch. Ijaz Ahmed, learned Deputy Attorney-General appearing for the petitioner, has vehemently contended that the Tribunal failed to decide the question of limitation in accordance with law and secondly, his submission was that the Tribunal could not have substituted the order of removal by the order of compulsory retirement.
3. Before dealing with the above contentions, we may observe that this is third round of litigation as the matter had come up before this Court twice earlier. Be that as it may, the above first contention as to the question of limitation is not tenable. Admittedly, the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to' condone the delay, which it did. Generally this Court does not examine the question of condonation of delay.
3-A. As regards the above second submission, it may be observed that the Tribunal has relied upon the case of WAPDA v. Abdul Sattar and 2 others 1990 SCM R 934 and the case of Aijaz Nabi Abbasi v.
Water and Power Development Authority and another 1992 SCM R 774.
In the above first case, somewhat similar argument was urged but the same was repelled as under:-- "2.In support of this petition it is urged that after the Tribunal had found that the Authority had sufficient reasons to take action against the respondents under section 17(1-A) it was not open to it to interfere with the orders made by the Authority. It is difficult to accept this contention. As an appellate forum the learned Tribunal could not only examine whether the order made by the Authority was supported by material but in suitable cases it could substitute the order of the Authority with one which it deemed to be more appropriate. Leave is refused in all these petitions."
In the above second case, the above view was reiterated as follows:-- "However, in the present case as observed hereinabove, it was not even alleged before the Tribunal that the impugned action was mala fide or suffers from any of the above infirmities. The Tribunal has taken into consideration all aspects of the case and has substituted retirement in place of removal as under above subsection (1-A) of section 17, an employee of WAPDA can either be removed or be retired."
4. In this view of the matter, the petitioner has no case for the grant of leave. Leave is, accordingly, refused.