AHMAD HASSAN vs SECRETARY, GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB, AGRICULTURE

' The appellant Ahmad Hassan was Assistant Research Officer, Ayub Agriculture Research Institute, Faisalabad. His appointment was made on ad hoc basis vide order dated 7-10-1991 (Annex. A). It was terminated by the order dated 29-11-1993 (Annex. E) issued by the Secretary, Agriculture.

Apparently it clarified that the ad hoc appointments of the appellant and his colleagues numbering forty, were terminated in terms of the Chief Minister's order of even Number dated 20- 9-1993. Aggrieved by it, he preferred a departmental representation on 28-1-1994 to the Governor and finding that it was not being disposed of within 90 days, he brought the instant appeal on 26- 5-1994.

2. The main reason advanced to assail the impugned order was that it was repugnant to subsection (2) of section 10 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 inasmuch as it could have been terminated only on appointment of a regularly selected incumbent against the post held by him and that since no such appointment was at all made, he would continue to avail it. He added that no reasons were disclosed as to why his appointment was terminated and lastly, that neither any notice, nor pay in lieu thereof as visualized by subsection (2) of section 10 ibid, was given to him. He relied upon 1991 SCM R 2330 in support of the assertion that even an Administrative Authority would give reasons for its orders and that in the instant case, failure on the part of the Secretary, Agriculture to give any reason for terminating the job in the impugned order, was fatal to it.

3. The appeal was opposed pleading that it was barred by time. It was further contended that ad hoc jobs including that of the appellant, were terminated in terms of the judgment of Supreme Court reported in 1993 SCM R 1287 which had to be enforced even by all State organs including this Tribunal. It was further contended that the appeal was barred by time inasmuch as the representation to the Governor was made on 17-11-1993, i.e, much before the impugned order dated 29-11-1993 was passed.

4. I have perused the judgment. With respect, it does not purport to lay down that all ad hoc employees hitherto holding jobs will be thrown out lock, stock and barrel. In fact no such incumbent was a party to the judgment and its application to them would be tantamount to condemning them unheard. The judgment conversely clearly ruled that in future such appointments might be avoided as those would affect the rights of the candidates having better merits. This was how the judgment laid down only a guideline for further recruitment.

5. Section 10 ibid is a provision of a statute. It permits recruitment on ad hoc basis and indeed it is not barred by any like provision. In cases of acute necessity, it authorises to take qualified candidates pending recruitment through the prescribed method. However, such appointment was subject to the condition that it would remain in effect till the time a regularly selected incumbent was taken for appointment against the post. Admittedly in this case no such regular incumbent was so far taken in the prescribed manner and until that contingency takes place, the appellant had a right to continue.

6. Considerable stress was laid by the learned District Attorney on the point of limitation maintaining that it was a case in which termination of service was ordered by the Chief Minister and that the appellant should have come to this Tribunal straightaway without availing any further departmental remedy. I have perused the order (Annex. F) rather with care and find that it proceeded from the Secretary. Although he purported to rely upon the Policy Decision issued by the Chief Minister yet termination was made in individual cases by the Secretary himself by passing operative orders. Besides, the appellant was not communicated any order issued by the Chief Minister and until it is acted upon by passing a suitable order, the appellant had no reason to feel disturbed. He would be affected by any executory order rather than the policy and hence it was the Secretary's order in dispute that furnished him the cause of action. The limitation in this case seems to have started running when the order dated 20-9-1993 (Annex. E) was passed. All subsequent orders including the one dated 29-11-1993 were clarificatory of the original order.

Counting limitation from 20-9-1993, the present appeal is in time and maintainable.

7. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed. The impugned Order is set aside and the appellant is reinstated with back benefits. It goes without saying that the appellant shall hold office till a regularly selected incumbent is appointed.