IKRAM ELAHI vs THE SETTLEMENT & REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER (LANDS), LAHORE AND 2 Other
This petition for leave to appeal arises from a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing a writ petition filed by the petitioner, who had purchased evacuee agricultural land from a third party during the pendency of litigation concerning that land. The core legal question was whether the petitioner, as a subsequent purchaser pendente lite, acquired a vested right in the land despite the original transfer to his vendor being declared void ab initio for want of notice to the original allottee, respondent No. 2. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner, having purchased the property during the pendency of earlier writ proceedings, was bound by the principle of lis pendens. The Court affirmed that the original cancellation of the allotment to respondent No. 2 was void ab initio for lack of notice, meaning the respondent’s rights as a temporary allottee remained intact throughout the litigation. Consequently, the Court upheld the High Court's decision, ruling that the petitioner could not claim independent rights or relief, as he had effectively purchased litigation and was subject to the final outcome of the proceedings.
- Does the principle of lis pendens bind a purchaser who acquires property during the pendency of litigation regarding that property?
- Can a purchaser of land, whose vendor's title is derived from an order declared void ab initio, claim a vested right in the property?
- Is a temporary allottee of evacuee land entitled to notice before the cancellation of their allotment?
1. MUHAMMAD GUL, J -This petition is from the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 15.9-1975 dismissing Writ Petition No. 6:65-R of 1970 moved by the petitioner herein.
2. The dispute concerns evacuee agricultural land measuring 18 kanals 13 martas bearing Khasra No. 48/3, in village Ram Kishanwala, now within the limits of Municipal Corporation of Lahore. In 1953 the land was given on temporary allotment to respondent No. 2, a displaced person, but who had rural claim Later in August 1960, without any notice to respondent 2, the land was proposed to respondent 3 and confirmed in his favour in April 1961. On 2-8-1966, respondent 3 sold the land to the petitioner herein and a mutation in favour of the latter was attested on 17-8-066.
3. In the meantime respondent 2 the original temporary allottee on being apprised of the transfer of the land to respondent 3, filed a revision before the Settlement Commissioner challenging the transfer of the land in favour of respondent 3. The revision was dismissed, and was followed by Writ Petition No. 128-R of 1963 by respondent No. 2. 1 he writ petition was allowed and the case was remanded to the Settlement Authorities to consider the question of transfer of the land after notice to respondent 2. On remand the Settlement Commissioner accepted the revision by order dated 8- 11-1966, restored the allotment of land in favour of respondent 2 cancelling of same from the name of respondent 3.
4. It appears it was during the pendency of the proceedings' in Writ Petition No. 128-R filed by respondent that respondent 3 sold the land to the petitioner. No step was however, taken either by him or by his transferor respondent 3 to implead him as respondent to the proceedings in the writ petition nor he was made a party to tire revisional proceedings after the remand of the case by the High Court.
5. The petitioner was thus not being a party to the proceedings before tine Settlement Commissioner culminating in the restoration of temporary allotment in favour of respondent No. 2, obliged to file Writ Petition No. 665-R of 1970 challenging the order of the Settlement Commissioner on the ground that with the transfer of the land by respondent No. 3 in hiss favour, he had acquired a vested right in the land and not being a party to the proceedings in revision and even in the proceedings in Writ Petition No. 128-R, he was not bound by the order of remand by the High Courtby the resultant order in the revision proceedings before the Settlement Commissioner. The High Court dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the petitioner had purchased the land from respondent 3 daring; pendency of the earlier, writ petition filed by respondent 2 and therefore had virtually "bought litigation" and that in any event was- hit by the principle of t pendensand therefore, was bound by the ultimate outcome of that litigation.
6. In support of this petition, petitioner's learned counsel repeated the argument which failed in the High Court. He stressed that the principle which weighed with the High Court to accept the writ petition moved by respondent 2 and to remand the case for a fresh decision merely on the ground that no notice had issued to respondent 2, availed to the petitioner with equal force and he should have been granted similar redress. The argument proceeds on a misconception. It entirely overlooks the fact that the petitioner is the ultimate beneficiary of an order which ab initio was void for wane of notice to respondent ' No. 2. The respondent 2 on the other hand, being a temporary allottee had a right to show-cause not' before his allotment was cancelled from his name.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner next argued that at the time when the temporary allotment of land was cancelled from the name of respon--dent 2, he was not eligible for the confirmation of the allotment because he had no claim for urban agricultural land. It was subsequent to the cancellation of the allotment from his name that under a fresh policy decision taken, he was made eligible for the confirmation of temporary allotment of urban land if he satisfied the condition of having remained in continuous possession for a period of not less than five years. It was stressed that the instructions issued could not operate retrospectively so as to avail to the benefit of respondent 2 who had lost the possession during the interregnum.
8. The argument is without substance for in the Writ Petition No. 128-R moved by respondent 2, the cancellation of the temporary allotment was held to be void-ab-initio for want of notice to him.
9. That being so, the respondent 2's rights as temporary allottee of the land remained unaffected.
10. However, that may be, the petitioner on the principle of Its peens has no independent right to further agitate in the matter.
Cited by 4 cases
- MUHAMMAD SHARIF etc. vs MEMBER, BOARD OF REVENUE, etc. 2016 PLJ Lahore 640
- Mst. BOR BIBI and others vs ABDUL QADIR and others 1996 SCMR 877
- MUHAMMAD YOUSAF Versus MUHAMMAD YOUNAS 1995 CLC 1780
- M. ABDUL RASHID vs THE SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER (P) And Other 1987 SCMR 1315