SHAHID IQBAL vs GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN through Secretary, Establishment Division, Islamabad and another
The petitioner, a permanent employee of the Central Board of Revenue (CBR) sent on deputation, sought leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court vacating an interim status quo order in his writ petition. The petitioner challenged his repatriation to his parent department, contending he had been permanently absorbed into the Senate Secretariat with the concurrence of the CBR. The core legal question was whether the petitioner had made out a prima facie case regarding his permanent absorption to justify the continuation of interim relief, considering the jurisdictional bar regarding civil servants. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal and held that the documents on record—showing no-objection letters from the CBR and requests to remove the petitioner's name from the CBR's officer strength—established a prima facie case that the absorption was done with competent consent. Furthermore, Senate employees do not fall within the category of civil servants under Article 87(3) of the Constitution. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and restored the status quo.
- Whether the vacation of an interim status quo order by a High Court was justified when documents prima facie established the permanent absorption of a deputationist?
- Do employees of the Senate Secretariat fall within the category of civil servants under the Constitution?
- Whether an interim injunction should be restored when a prima facie case and official regularity are demonstrated on the record?
- Article 87(3), Constitution of Pakistan 1973
1. ' SAIDUZZAMAN SIDDIQUI, J.---The petitioner has sought leave to appeal against the order of a learned Judge in Chamber of Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, dated 2-10-1994 whereby an interim order directing maintenance of status quo during pendency of the Writ Petition No,937 of 1994 instituted by the petitioner was vacated.
2. ' Grant of leave is opposed on behalf of the Government and Raja Muhammad Bashir, DA.-G. Has appeared and argued the case. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned DA.-G. And after hearing them converted this petition into appeal which is disposed of as follows.
3. ' The petitioner was a permanent employee of Central Board of Revenue (CBR) in BPS.19. The services of the petitioner were placed at the disposal of Implementation Tribunal for Newspaper Employees as Member in Grade-20. On 27-5-1989 the appellant was sent on deputation to the Senate Secretariat as Joint Secretary in BPS-20. Vide Notification dated 21-7-1994 the Federal Government placed the services of the appellant at the parent department CBR with immediate effect. The petitioner challenged the above decision of the Government in a writ petition filed before Lahore High Court contending that he has been absorded in Senate Secretariat on 26-1- 1993 with the concurrence of his parent department, respondent No,2. The appellant alongwith writ petition filed an application for interim relief on which ad interim order of status quo was granted but subsequently with the respondents appeared in Court and contested the grant of status quo order on the ground of jurisdiction, the learned Judge in Chamber vacated the interim order of status quo holding that the petitioner has failed to make out a prima facie case. The reason which pursuaded the learned Judge in Chamber to vacate the interim order is that the appellant was found to be a civil servant and the controversy related to the terms and conditions of his service.
4. ' The learned counsel for the petitioner invited our intention to various letters on record which prima facie show that the request for absorption of the appellant permanently in the Senate Secretariat was forwarded by the parent department namely CBR to the Secretary Establishment Division and that the CBR by letter dated 24-1-1993 addressed to the Secretary, Senate Secretariat forwarded its no objection for absorption of the appellant as Joint Secretary in the Senate Secretariat. There are number of letters on record which show that the CBR while considering the request of the appellant for being observed permanently in the Senate Secretariat as Joint Secretary has written to the Establishment Division stating their no objection to the absorption of the appellant as Joint Secretary in the Senate Secretariat with effect from the date he joined Senate Secretariat. The learned counsel for the appellant has also invited our intention to another letter dated 20-2-1993 wherein the parent department of the appellant (CBR) has asked for the advice of Establishment Division to remove the name of the appellant from the strength of officers of Income Tax Group on the ground that he has been permanently absorbed in Senate Secretariat. There is nothing on record to show that the request made by the appellant was turned down or the request made by CBR to the Establishment Division for removal of his name from the strength of CBR was turned down. The learned D.A.G., however, contended before us that No-Objection Certificate (N.O.C.) given by CBR was of no consequence as the relevant authority which could give N.O.C. For absorption of the appellant, who was in Grade-19, was the Establishment Secretary who never gave his N.O.C. For absorption of the appellant in the Senate Secretariat. At this stage, it is not necessary to go deep to consider this question as the question of grant of interim relief was dependent on the existence of prima facie case in favour of the appellant. The documents referred to above clearly show that the CBR, the parent department of the appellant, had no objection to the absorption of the appellant as a permanent employee of Senate Secretariat and that the CBR has forwarded this request to the concerned authority namely Establishment Division for according no objection. The documents on record prima facie show that at one stage CBR in fact has stated its no objection to the Senate Secretariat for obsorption of appellant on permanent basis as Joint Secretary and thereafter CBR moved the Establishment Division for removal of the name of appellant from the strength of Officers of Income Tax Group. These documents prima facie establish a case that the appellant's abosorption as Joint Secretary in Grade-20 in the Senate Secretariat was with the consent of the authorities concerned. The contention of the learned DA.G. That the N.O.C. Issued by the CBR was of no consequence as the no objection should have been given from the concerned authority namely, Establishment Division, requires going into merits of the case deeper which can be done at the regular hearing of the case. At present it is sufficient to state that there is a presumption that all official acts have been performed regularly and since the record so far produced before the Court shows, that the CBR had written to the Establishment Division for according their no objection to the absorption of the appellant on permanent basis in the Senate Secretariat and that the CBR also gave no objection directly to the Senate Secretariat and took action for removal of name of the appellant from the strength of the officers of Income-tax Group, would prima facie show that the appellant was absorbed in the Senate Secretariat with the consent of the competent Authority. It is not disputed before us that the employees of Senate do not fall in the category of civil servants in view of the provisions contained in Article 87 (3) of the Constitution. We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the learned Judge in Chamber of High Court and restore the status quo order earlier granted in the case. We will, however, observe that as the respondents are contesting legality of absorption of the appellant on permanent basis in the Senate Secretariat and are insisting for reversion of the appellant to his parent department namely, CBR which cannot be done in view of the status quo order in the case.
5. It will be appropriate that the petition before the High Court is disposed of within three months.
6. Appeal stands disposed of, accordingly.
Cited by 2 cases
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- MUHAMMAD AZAM DAWI vs SPEAKER, BALOCHISTAN PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY 1996 PLC (C.S.) 969