AKHTAR HUSSAIN vs CHAIRMAN, PUNJAB LABOUR APPELLATE TRIBUNAL and 3

ORDER

' MUHAMMAD ILYAS, J.---Facts giving rise to this petition for leave to appeal are that the petitioner, Akhtar Hussain was appointed as a Junior Clerk with the Hoechst Pharmaceutical pakistan (Pvt.)

Ltd., Karachi, on 12th September, 1977. In due course, he was promoted as Junior Officer on 22nd August, 1984. According to clause (3) of the promotion letter, his services were liable to be dispensed with, on one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof. His services were actually terminated with effect from 1st April, 1988 in terms of the aforesaid clause.

2. Feeling aggrieved by the order in this regard the petitioner filed a grievance petition under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance,. 1969, before the Punjab Labour Court No, 4 at Faisalabad. The petition was opposed by the said Company, hereinafter referred to as the respondent, on the ground that the petitioner was holding an office of managerial, administrative and supervisory nature. The respondent's plea was that in view of the position held by the petitioner at the time of termination of his services, he was not a workman and, therefore, the petition was not competent. In reply, it was submitted by the petitioner that despite his promotion, he was doing typing work etc., and was therefore, a workman who could invoke the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. The parties led evidence to substantiate their respective pleas. The learned Labour Court, however, accepted the contention of the respondent and refused the desired relief to the petitioner.

3. The petitioner then went in appeal before the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore. The learned Tribunal accepted the appeal and ordered reinstatement of the petitioner, without back benefits, after setting aside the decision of the learned Labour Court. View taken by the learned Tribunal was that the petitioner was a workman for the purpose of the said Ordinance.

4. The respondent assailed the decision of the learned Tribunal by filing a writ petition. A learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court thoroughly examined the case and reached the conclusion that the petitioner was not a workman. He, therefore, allowed the Constitutional petition and set aside the order of the learned Tribunal.

5. Now, the petitioner seeks leave to appeal against the judgment of the learned Judge in Chamber.

6. Whether or not the petitioner is a workman is a question of fact on which there is well-considered verdict of the learned Single Judge against the petitioner. It was not denied by learned counsel for the petitioner, who argued the matter before us, that the petitioner was Sales Officer at the time of termination of his services. His contention, however, was that despite his promotion as such Officer, he was doing ministerial work and, therefore, he deserved. To be treated as a workman.

7. We have gone through the evidence on the record and find that there are number of documents which are written or singed by the petitioner as a Sales Officer. Since he knew the technique of typing, for having initially joined the respondent as a typist, if he had typed one or more documents himself, in order to save time or for any other reason, that would not change his upgraded position of an Officer. If he was found of handling ministerial work instead of doing the job of an Officer or the respondent wanted to continue with him as a Typist, there was hardly any occasion for promoting him as an officer. The petitioner was certainly an Officer enjoying supervisory status when his services were terminated and, therefore, he could not fall back on his original position with a view to challenging the order of termination of his services which was made, at the time when he was working as an Officer. It was not disputed that the termination of his services did not offend against the contents of the letter by which he was promoted. In other words, he was fired in consonance with the terms and conditions on which he had been promoted.

8. In view of the above discussion, we are not inclined to grant leave to appeal against the impugned judgment and dismiss this petition.