Pakistan Case Law
1976 SCMR 73

Maulvi GHULAM RASOOL vs ADMINISTRATOR AUQAF, SIND AND Another

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Citation1976 SCMR 73
CourtSupreme Court of Pakistan
Case No.Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. K-126 of 1975 Writ Petition No.
Date1975-10-24
Judge(s)Anwarul Haq and Muhammad Gul
Authored byMuhammad Gul
ResultPetition dismissed
AI Summary — generated from this judgment; read the full text below and verify before relying on it.

The petitioner, a Khatib and Pesh Imam, challenged the termination of his employment by the Auqaf Department. Originally employed by a religious society since 1952, the petitioner accepted a fresh appointment letter from the Auqaf Department in 1969, which explicitly stipulated that his service was purely temporary and terminable on one month's notice or payment in lieu thereof. Following the termination of his services in 1974, the petitioner filed a writ petition before the High Court, contending that his long-standing service conferred a status of permanency. The High Court dismissed the petition in limine, upholding the contractual terms of the new engagement. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision. The Court held that the petitioner's employment with the Auqaf Department constituted a new engagement governed by the specific terms of the appointment letter, which he had accepted. The Court further noted that there was no evidence suggesting his prior employment with the society was permanent. Consequently, the principle established is that an employee who accepts a new contract with specific temporary terms cannot claim permanency based on previous service history.

Questions settled in this judgment
  • Does a fresh appointment letter with explicit temporary terms supersede prior service history in determining employment status?
  • Can an employee claim permanent status based on long-standing service if the subsequent contract of employment is explicitly temporary?
  • Is a writ petition maintainable against the termination of a purely temporary employee whose services were dispensed with according to the terms of their appointment?
Laws & provisions referred
  • Registration of Societies Act 1860
service lawtemporary employmenttermination of servicecontractual employmentAuqaf Departmentwrit jurisdiction

1. MUHAMMAD GUL, J.----The petitioner was employed as Khatib and Pesh Imam, as from 1952 by a religious society registered under the Registration of Societies Act 18(61. For Masjid Lobar to Larkana.

2. The Masjid, it appears, was taken over by Auqaf Department and the Administrator issued to the petitioner a fresh letter of appointment on 18-11-1969 informing him that his future service will be "purely temporary and his services may be terminated on one month's notice or in lieu thereof month's pay shall be paid." It appears that the petitioner accepted this condition.

3. Later the Administrator by a letter issued to him terminated the petitioner's appointment with effect from 1-7-1974 and informed him that in lieu of one month's notice he shall be paid salary for a month.

4. Aggrieved by the above order, the petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 294 of 1975 in the High Court at Karachi to call in question the legality of the order. He also complained that he has no- so far been paid one month's salary in lieu of the notice, The High Court however, dismissed his writ petition in limine on the short ground that under the terms of his employ--ment with the Auqaf Department, his service was purely temporary terminable on one month's notice.

5. The petitioner who appeared in person however, submitted that he has been Khatib and Pesh Imam of the mosque continuously, from 1952 ands therefore had acquired the status of permanency. This is plainly misconceived. As rightly pointed by the High Court, the petitioner's service with the Auqaf Department was new engagement which was on purely temporary basis.

6. Moreover, there is nothing whatever to show that the petitioner's previous employment with the Society was or permanent basis.

7. The petition is accordingly dismissed.

Cited by 4 cases

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