MUHAMMAD BAKHSH vs Mst. RUQAYYA BEGUM and others
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order of the Lahore High Court, which dismissed the petitioner's second appeal against an ejectment order concerning a shop. The core legal question is whether a consent order passed by the High Court based on an agreement by the petitioner's counsel—wherein the petitioner was granted time to vacate the premises—is binding upon the petitioner when the counsel acted to secure time upon realizing the court was not inclined to rule in the petitioner's favor. The Supreme Court held that the consent order, negotiated and agreed upon by counsel after extensive arguments in good faith to obtain an extension of time, is fully binding on the petitioner, and the contention that instructions were lacking cannot be accepted. The key principle laid down is that a bona fide concession or compromise entered into by a counsel during court proceedings to secure a beneficial outcome for the client is binding on the client, and leave to appeal against such a consent order will be refused.
- Is a consent order passed by the High Court based on an agreement by the petitioner's counsel binding on the petitioner?
- Can a client challenge a consent order on the ground that the counsel acted without specific instructions after arguing the matter at length?
- Whether leave to appeal should be granted against an order where the appellant's counsel opted to secure time to vacate the premises rather than face immediate dismissal?
ORDER
' AJMAL MIAN, J.---This is a petition for leave to appeal against the order dated 10-5-1994 passed by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court in S.A.O. No,24 of 1993 filed by the petitioner against the order of ejectment dated 6-2-1993 of the learned District Judge, in Civil Appeal No,103/14 of 1992, disposing of the same in the following terms:-- "Appeal was argued at length by Qazi Umar Draz, Advocate, learned counsel for the appellant. At the end, second appeal was not pressed and the appellant agreed for time till 31-12-1994 to vacate the shop in question and surrender its possession to the respondents. Learned counsel for the respondents consented to for allowing the agreed time to the appellant for vacating the shop.
' Upon the above agreed premises, second appeal is dismissed; appellant is allowed to vacate the shop in question on or before 31-12-1994, subject to payment of agreed monthly rent in advance before 15th of each calendar month. Default in payment of rent for two consecutive months shall authorize the respondents to execute the eviction order before the expiry of the agreed time."
2. From the above quoted portion of the order, it seems that it was a consent order passed after arguments were heard at length. It is apparent that the learned Judge in Chambers was not inclined to admit the above S.A.O. Thereupon, the learned counsel for the petitioner, sought time to vacate the shop on or before 31-12-1994. The contention of the petitioner that the above consent was given without his instructions, cannot be accepted. As stated above, when the aforesaid S.A.O.
Came up for hearing, it was argued at length. It appears that when the learned counsel for the petitioner found that his :above S.A.O. Was going to be dismissed by the learned Judge in Chambers, he acted in good faith by obtaining more than six months for the petitioner. The above bona fide act on the part of the Advocate, who appeared for the petitioner, cannot be said as not binding on him. Leave is refused.