MUHAMMAD YOUSAF vs ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE and anothers
This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, which set aside the revisional order of the Additional District Judge extending the time for the deposit of pre-emption money. The core legal question concerns the competence of a revisional court or trial court to extend the time for depositing pre-emption money after the original time period specified in a pre-emption decree has expired, particularly following the restoration of an ex parte decree. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine whether the learned Single Judge in Chambers was justified in interfering with the judgment of the Additional District Judge. The key principle involves the procedural requirements regarding the fixing or extension of time for depositing pre-emption money upon the restoration of an ex parte pre-emption decree.
- Whether a court is required to fix a fresh time for the deposit of pre-emption money upon the restoration of an ex parte pre-emption decree?
- Is a District Judge or Additional District Judge competent in revision to extend the time for depositing pre-emption money when the original time has expired?
- Whether the High Court is justified in interfering with a revisional order that extends the time for the deposit of pre-emption money in a pre-emption suit?
- Order IX Rule 13, Code of Civil Procedure 1908
ORDER
' AJMAL MIAN, J.---This is a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment dated 24-5-1993 of a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High. Court in Writ Petition No,4463 of 1987 filed by respondent No,2 against revision order dated 8-9-1987 of the learned Additional District Judge, Narowal, in Civil Revision No,17 of 1983 extending time for deposit of pre-emption money amounting to Rs,15,000 (inclusive Zar-e-Punj am) by 18-9-1987, allowing the same on the ground that the learned Additional District Judge was not competent, to extend time as the learned trial Court could not have extended after having become focus officio. The petitioner has, therefore, filed the present petition for leave to appeal.
2. The brief facts are that respondent No,2 filed a pre-emption suit against the petitioner in respect of suit property. The same was decreed ex parte on 6-7-1982 subject to payment of pre-emption money (inclusive of Zar-e-Punjam, if deposited) up to 19-9-1982. Respondent No,2 filed an application under Order IX, Rule 13, C.P.C. For setting aside ex parte decree on 8-7-1982, which application was allowed by an order dated 2-10-1982 subject to payment of costs of Rs,50.
However, when the matter came up for hearing on 10-6-1984, it transpired that respondent No,2 has not deposited the above costs and stated that he would have no objection to the restoration of ex parte decree by recalling the aforesaid order dated 2-10-1982 for setting aside the same. On the basis of the above statement, the aforementioned decree was restored by an order dated 10-6- 1986, but no time for deposit of pre-emption money was fixed as the original time had already expired on 19-9-1982. The petitioner filed an application before the learned Civil Judge for extension of time, which was declined by him by his above order dated 24-1-1987. Thereupon, the petitioner filed aforesaid Civil Revision, which was allowed by the learned Additional District Judge by his above judgment dated 8-9-1987. Against the above judgment, respondent No,2 filed aforesaid writ petition, which was upheld by the High Court and the above provisional judgment was set aside.
3. In support of the above petition, Mr. Shaukat Ali Mehar, learned ASC appearing for the petitioner, has contended that at the time of restoration of the ex parte decree on 10-6-1984, the learned Civil Judge should have fixed the fresh time for deposit of the pre-emption money as the time specified in the ex parte decree which was set aside has already expired and, therefore, the learned Additional District Judge was justified in passing the above order.
4. We are inclined to grant leave to consider, whether the learned Judge in Chambers was justified in interfering with the above judgment of the learned Additional District Judge. Leave is, accordingly, granted.