BOARD OF INTERMEDIATE AND SECONDARY EDUCATION, LAHORE through Chairman vs BASHIR AHMAD KHAN

1. ' MUKHTAR AHMED JUNEJO, J---This is a Civil Review Petition, for review of the judgment by a learned Bench of this Court dated 12-3-1996, dismissing Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No,1367-L of 1995.

2. ' Respondent Bashir Ahmad Khan filed Civil Suit No,140/1 of 1992 in a Civil Court at Lahore against the petitioner Board for declaration that his correct date of birth was 10-10-1942 and not 10-10-1940 mentioned in his Matriculation Certificate issued by office of the petitioner. In support of his claim the respondent examined himself and two witnesses and produced certain documents.

3. ' The suit was contested by the petitioner, who took stand that date of birth mentioned in respondent's matriculation certificate was the same which was mentioned in his admission form and that he had no cause-of-action. It was added that the respondent never applied to the petitioner Board for correction. After settlement of issues and recording of evidence, the trial Court under judgment dated 30-5-1994 dismissed the suit. Said judgment was challenged without success in Civil Appeal No,515 of 1994, which was dismissed by the Additional District Judge on 6-11- 1994. Respondent took the matter to the Lahore High Court where his Civil Revision No,438 of 1995 was accepted under a judgment dated 11-10-1995. Said judgment was assailed before this Court in C.P.S.L.A. No,1367-L of 1995, which was dismissed by a learned Bench of this Court on 12-3-1996.

4. Hence this petition for review.

5. ' Chaudhry Ijaz Ahmad, learned counsel for the petitioner Board argued that the respondent had managed the birth entry in the relevant record on 28-8-1989 showing his date of birth to be 10-10- 1942, while in his admission form Exh.DW-1/1 the respondent has given his date of birth as 10-10- 1940. Learned counsel referred to regulations of the petitioner Board prescribing the mode about change of date of birth and argued that the decree by the High Court cannot be against the regulations of the petitioner Board. In support learned counsel cited the cases of M.R. Khalid v. Chief Secretary, Punjab and another (1994 SCM R 1633); (ii) Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation v. Sabedar Major (Retd.) Abdul Raziaq (1995 SCM R 1219) and (iii) WAPDA through its Chairman and another v.

6. Muhammad Nawaz Khan and another (1995 SCM R 1216).

7. It may be observed here, that as per order XXVI, Rule 1 of Supreme Court Rules, 1980 read with Order 47, Rule 1 of Civil Procedure Code, a review is competent only if there is discovery of new and important matter or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the parties seeking review or it could not be produced by such party at the time when the order under review was made. Under the same provisions, an order can also be reviewed on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason. In the case of Rambir Prasad v. Sheobaran Singh (AIR 1939 All. 619) it was observed that the fact that a different view on certain question of law is possible is hardly any ground for review. In the case of S.P. Awate v. C.P. Fernandes and another (AIR 1959 Born. 466) the view taken was that the error contemplated is an error so manifest, so clear, that no Court would permit such an error to remain on the record and that it would not be correct to say that when two views on a question of law are possible and the Court has taken one view, the fact that the other view is more acceptable view would render the first view an error apparent on the face of the record. In the case of Lt.-Col. Nawabzada Muhammad Amir Khan v. The Controller of Estate Duty, Government of Pakistan (PLD 1962 SC 335) it was held that even if there be material irregularity but there is no substantial injury consequent thereon, the exercise of power of review to alter the judgment would not necessarily be required as the irregularity must be of such a nature as converts the process from being one in aid of justice to a process that brings about injustices. In the same case it was held that to permit a review on the ground of incorrectness would amount to granting the Court the jurisdiction to hear appeals against its own judgments. In the case of Raja Prithwi Chand Lal Choudhry v. Sukhraj Rai and others (AIR 1941 FC 1) it was observed that the Federal' Court will not sit as a Court of Appeal from its own decisions nor will it entertain applications to review on the ground only that one of the parties in the case conceives himself to be aggrieved by the decision and that the Federal Court will exercise its power of review for the purpose of rectifying mistakes which have crept in. In the case of Syed Muhammad Zaki v. Maqsood Ali Khan (PLD 1976 SC 308) it was observed that merely because a decision of case is erroneous per se is not a ground to justify its review for what would seriously impair the finality attaching to the judgment of this Court which allowed the apex of the judicial system, but if there be found a material irregularity in the decision which converts the process from being one in aid of justice to a process which brings about injustice, or if the decision is in conflict with the law of the land then it would be the duty of the Court to mend the error. In Ramaswa mi Fadayachi v. Shanmugha Fadayachi ((1959) 2 Mad. U 201) it was held that where the judgment is based on two or more grounds, each of which is sufficient to sustain it independently of the others, it is not liable to be reviewed even though one of the said grounds is erroneous and the error may even be apparent on the face of the record.

8. ' The present case requires to be examined within the parameters laid down by law. The fact that 10-10-1940 was mentioned in the admission form Exh.DW-1/1 was before the High Court as well as before the learned Bench of this Court which passed the judgment under review. The High Court has noted this fact at page 5 of its judgment. This fact is also mentioned in para. 2 of the judgment under review. It cannot be said that the High Court or learned Bench of this Court were not aware of the said fact. It appears that learned Bench of this Court did not consider the respondent to be bound by the contents of the form Exh.DW-1/1. The birth entry, is said to have been made in the record showing on 28-8-1989, but it is not the case of the petitioner that prior to making of such entry any other entry was available in record showing that the respondent was born on 10-10-1940.

9. The fact whether the respondent moved applications before the petitioner Board for correction of his birth date in the record before filing the suit, was asserted by the respondent side and was rebutted by the petitioner side. However, no issue on such point was necessary. It was not mandatory for the respondent to move the petition in Board first before invoking the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. The authorities cited on behalf of the petitioner could have been considered had they been cited before the learned Bench which decided the petition. In the case of Muhammad Nawaz Khan (1995 SCM R 1216) the concerned civil servant on the eve of his retirement came up with a decree from the Civil Court to gain more years in service. The respondent did not file the suit on the eve of his retirement. In case of M.R. Khalid (1994 SCM R 1633), a civil servant declared his date of birth while taking competitive examination and thereafter remained in service for 35 years and his date of birth appeared in gradation list without any protest from him and it was held that mere obtaining of Civil Court decree for correction of date of birth did not advance his case when the Government was not a party to the suit. In the present case the petitioner is not the employer of the respondent. In the case of Subedar Major (Retd.) Abdul Razzaq (1995 SCM R 1219) this Court only granted leave to appeal without laying down any rule to be followed.

10. The petitioner has not made out if there was discovery of new and important matter or evidence which after exercise of due diligence was not available or if there was any mistake or error apparent on the face of record. Mere fact that a different opinion can be formed on the basis of evidence on record is no ground for review. This petition therefore merits dismissal and stands dismissed.