Ch. FAYYAZ AHMAD vs Mst. HIDAYAT BEGUM And 21 Other

ZIA MAHMOOD MIRZA, J.---Petitioner seeks leave to appeal against an order of a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, dated 25-10-1993 dismissing his appeal (ICA 147/93) "as being barred by law of limitation".

2. Facts necessary for the disposal of this petition, briefly stated, are that a learned Single Judge of the High Court by his order dated 14-6-1993 passed in Writ Petition No.1999 of 1993 quashed an F.I.R.

Registered at the instance of the present petitioner with Anti-Corruption Establishment, Multan under sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 109, P.P.C. The learned Judge also awarded costs of Rs.5,000 payable by the petitioner. Order of the learned Single Judge was passed on 14-6-1993. Copy thereof was applied for on 16-6-1993. It was prepared by the copying agency on 11-7-1993 and delivered to the petitioner on 13-7-1993. Intra-Court Appeal was admittedly filed on 25-8-1993 and re-filed on 16-9-1993 after removing office objections. Even if 25-8-1993 is taken as the date of institution of I.C.A., it was barred by 26 days. Petitioner, therefore, moved an .Application under section 5 of Limitation Act wherein the delay was sought to be explained on the premises that since the High Court was closed for long summer vacations, petitioner's counsel was of the opinion that limitation would .Not run during the vacations. This explanation was not accepted and the I.C.A.

Was dismissed as the-barred.

3. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner. He has contended that as the limitation expired during the long vacations, the appeal could well be filed on the day of re-opening of the High Court which according to him re--opened on 9-9-1993. We find no merit in this contention as it is an admitted position that the Multan Bench of the High Court had been functioning throughout the summer vacations and it is admitted by the learned counsel that the matters such as the petitioner's I.C.A. Could be filed even during the summer vacations more so when the matter was of urgent nature. On our query, learned counsel has stated that the petitioner had also moved an application for stay of the impugned order of the learned Single Judge. In the circumstances, the plea taken by the petitioner had no substance and was rightly given no weight by the learned Judges of the Division Bench of the High Court. In any case, the matter of condonation of delay rested in the discretion of the learned Judges exercise whereof has not been shown to suffer from any such legality as would warrant interference by this Court. This petition is accordingly dismissed.