EVACUEE TRUST PROPERTY BOARD, LAHOREAnd Another vs Sardar BALBEER
This petition for leave to appeal challenged a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had declared an auction of evacuee trust property by the Chairman of the Evacuee Trust Property Board as without lawful authority. The respondents raised preliminary objections regarding the petition's limitation period and the failure to annex the High Court paper book. The Supreme Court rejected these objections, holding that the time spent obtaining a certified copy of the judgment must be excluded under the Limitation Act, 1908, rendering the petition timely. Furthermore, the Court dismissed the objection regarding the missing paper book as a technicality that did not warrant non-suiting the petitioners. On the merits, the petitioners argued that the High Court erred in holding that a formal declaration under section 8 of the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975, was a prerequisite for auctioning trust property, particularly when the property's status as evacuee trust property was undisputed. Finding these contentions required deeper examination, the Court granted leave to appeal.
- Is the time spent obtaining a certified copy of a judgment excluded from the limitation period for filing a petition for leave to appeal?
- Can a petition be dismissed solely for failing to annex the High Court paper book as required by the Supreme Court Rules 1980?
- Does the absence of a formal declaration under section 8 of the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act 1975 invalidate the auction of property that is otherwise undisputed as evacuee trust property?
- Section 12, Limitation Act 1908
- Order 13 Rule 3, Supreme Court Rules 1980
- Section 8, Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act 1975
1. SAIDUZZAMAN SIDDIQUI, J.--The petitioners are seeking leave to appeal against the judgment of a learned Judge in Chambers of Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, dated 19-12-1994 whereby the learned Judge while accepting the writ petition filed by the respondent No. l declared the auction of property attached to charitable and religious trust by the Chairman, Evacuee Trust Property Board as without lawful authority and of no legal effect.
2. A caveat has been filed in the above petition on behalf of the respondents and the learned counsel for the caveators has raised to preliminary objections to the maintainability of the above petition. It is firstly contended by the learned counsel that the petition filed before this Court is barred by the by 3 days. The second objection of the learned counsel for the caveators is that the petitioners while submitting petition before this Court failed to annex the paper book of the High Court as required under Order 13, Rule 3, sub-rule (i.e) of Supreme Court Rules, 1980.
3. We would first of all deal with the preliminary objections raised by the learned counsel for the caveators. The first objection relates to the maintainability of the petition on the ground that it is barred by the. The admitted position in the case is that the writ petition was heard by the learned Judge in Chambers of Lahore High Court on 2-11-1994 and judgment was reserved. The judgment was announced on 3,19-12-1994 but before announcement of the judgment the petitioners had applied for certified copy of the judgment on 7-11-1994. The copy of the judgment was made ready by the office of the High Court on 5-1-1995 and it was delivered to the petitioners on 8-1-1995. The petition was presented before this Court on 9-3-1995. Under section 12 of the Limitation Act, the period spent in obtaining a certified copy of the judgment appealed against is to be excluded. In the present case, the period from 19-12-1994 (the date on which judgment was announced) to 8-1- 1995 (the date of delivery of the certified copy of the judgment to the. Petitioners) is to be excluded for the purpose of computation of the period of limitation prescribed for filing of petition before this Court. It is not disputed that the period of limitation prescribed under the law for filing a petition before this Court is 60 days. If 60 days are counted from 20-12-1994 (the date of announcement of judgment is to be excluded under section 12 of the Limitation Act) 60 days would expire on 17-2- 1995. If the period spent by the petitioners in obtaining certified copy of the judgment appealed against is excluded then the petition presented before this Court on 9-3-1995 was within the. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the contention of the respondents that the petition filed before this Court was barred by limitation. The second preliminary objection raised by the respondents is that the petitioners while filing petition before this Court have not complied with the provisions of Order 13, Rule 3, sub-rule (i.e) of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980. No such objection was raised by the office when the petition was presented before this Court. In any case this objectionappears to be more technical in nature and for this reason alone, the petitioners cannot be non-suited if they otherwise have a case on merits. We, therefore, overrule this objection of respondents also.
4. On merits, the learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the observation of the learned Judge in Chambers that without a declaration under section 8 of Act XVII of 1975 the trust property could not be put to auction, is the result of misappreciation of law. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the question of determining the evacuee trust nature of the property would only arise if someone objected to the nature of the property. In the present case it was nobody's case that the property was not an evacuee trust property and as such the question of declaring it as an evacuee property under section 8 of Act XVIII of 1975 did not arise. It is, accordingly, contended that as the property was an evacuee trust property and it vested in the Evacuee Trust Board, its auction could not be objected to solely on the ground that the trust property could not be disposed of through auction. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners require examination and we, accordingly, grant leave to appeal to consider the same.