GHULAM MUHAMMAD vs NOOR MUHAMMAD And 4 Other
The petitioner, a complainant in an anti-corruption case, sought leave to appeal against the order of the Lahore High Court dismissing his revision petition, which had challenged the trial court's dismissal of his application under section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 for permission to produce additional documents. The trial had been pending for sixteen years, and the application was filed only after the prosecution had closed its evidence and immediately before recording the statement of the accused under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The trial court and the High Court both declined the request, noting that the documents would not assist without further evidence requiring a de novo trial. The Supreme Court held that the trial court was justified in disallowing the request and the High Court rightly refused to interfere, as no factual, legal, or jurisdictional infirmity existed in the impugned orders. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and refused leave to appeal, affirming the principles regarding discretionary powers to summon additional evidence at a belated stage.
- Whether a trial court is justified in refusing an application for additional evidence filed at the close of the prosecution case after a prolonged delay?
- Can the High Court interfere in its revisional jurisdiction with the discretionary order of a trial court dismissing a belated application under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Whether the Supreme Court will grant leave to appeal against concurrent findings refusing permission to produce additional documents at a belated stage of the trial?
- Section 540, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898
- Section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898
ORDER
ZIA MAHMOOD MIRZA, J. ---Petitioner, a complainant in an anti--corruption case, has filed this petition seeking leave to appeal against the order of a Single Judge of the Lahore High Court dated 22-12-1993 whereby his revision petition directed against the dismissal of his application under section 540, Cr.P.C., moved for permission to produce certain documents, was dismissed.
2. Facts stated in the impugned judgment, which have not been controverted by the learned counsel for the petitioner, are that in a case registered in the year 1977, challan was submitted before a Magistrate, who held the trial, but it was noticed at some stage that the Special Judge, Anticorruption, had exclusive jurisdiction in the matter. Case was, therefore, transferred to the file of the Special Judge. Prosecution had cited six witnesses in all, to were given up and the remaining were examined in 1992. It was at the close of the prosecution case that the petitioner made an application under section 540, Cr.P.C., before the Trial Court for permission to produce some documents. This application was dismissed by the Trial Court with the observation that the case is hanging fire for the past 16 years and at no stage, the petitioner deemed it necessary to apply for additional evidence and he moved the application only when the prosecution had closed its evidence and the statement of the accused under section 342, Cr.P.C., was to be recorded. Trial Court also took note of the fact that the documents sought to be produced by the petitioner would not be of any help to him unless some evidence was led to prove the identity of the ascribe, which would mean starting the trial all over again. Learned Judge in the High Court was satisfied with the reasoning of the Trial Court and, therefore, he declined to interfere in revisional jurisdiction.
3. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and find that on the facts stated hereinabove which have not been controverted, the Trial Court was perfectly justified in disallowing the petitioner's request for additional evidence. High Court rightly refused to interfere with that order. Learned counsel has not been able to point out any infirmity, factual, legal or jurisdictional, in the impugned orders, which in fact are unexceptionable. This petition has no merit and the same is accordingly dismissed and the leave sought is refused.