Pakistan Case Law
1997 SCMR 976

GHULAM RASOOL And Others vs SARDAR UL HASSAN And Another

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Citation1997 SCMR 976
CourtSupreme Court of Pakistan
Case No.Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No. 567-L of 1994 Civil Revision No. 337 of
Date1997-10-23
Judge(s)Ajmal Mian and Zia Mahmood Mirza
Authored byAjmal Mian
ResultLeave granted
AI Summary — generated from this judgment; read the full text below and verify before relying on it.

This is a petition for leave to appeal directed against the order of the Lahore High Court upholding the decision of the Senior Civil Judge, Mianwali, which had set aside a decree dated 18-3-1976 pursuant to an application under Section 12(2), C.P.C. The core legal questions involve whether a court is legally bound to refer disputed signatures to a handwriting expert rather than comparing them itself, and whether the time spent in prosecuting a prior proceeding can be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act when computing limitation for an application under Section 12(2), C.P.C. The Supreme Court held that while it is advisable to send disputed signatures to an expert, a court possesses the inherent power to compare signatures itself without rendering its order legally infirm, and granted leave to appeal to examine whether the lower court's finding regarding the timeliness of the Section 12(2) application under the Limitation Act accords with the law. The key principle laid down is that a court may competently compare disputed signatures with admitted signatures without an expert opinion.

Questions settled in this judgment
  • Is a court legally mandated to refer a disputed signature to a handwriting expert, or can it compare the signature itself?
  • Can the time spent prosecuting a previous proceeding be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act for an application under Section 12(2), C.P.C.?
  • Does the failure to refer a disputed signature to a handwriting expert render the court's judgment legally infirm?
Laws & provisions referred
  • Section 12(2), C.P.C.
  • Section 14 of the Limitation Act
petition for leave to appealfraud and misrepresentationhandwriting expertcomparison of signatureslimitation periodcivil revision

ORDER

AJMAL MIAN, J.---This is a petition for leave to appeal against the order dated 30-3-1994 of a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court passed in Civil Revision No.337 of 1994 filed by the petitioners against the order of the Senior Civil Judge, Mianwali, passed upon a miscellaneous application under section 12(2), C.P.C., filed by the respondents holding that the same was within the as the the spent h--. The respondents in prosecuting the suit was liable to be excluded under section 14 of the Limitation Act and that the decree dated 18-3-1976 obtained was liable to be set aside and which was in fact set aside, declining the same. The petitioners have, therefore, filed the present petition for leave to appeal.

2. In support of the above petition Malik Noor Muhammad Awan, learned ASC for the petitioners, has contended that the learned trial Court was not justified in recording its finding on the question of signature by comparing the signature in dispute with the admitted signature as it was required to refer the matter to the handwriting expert.

3.The above contention is untenable as it is within the power of a Court to compare the disputed signature with the admitted signature and to form it---s view though it is advisable to refer the matter to the handwriting expert. However, the fact that the same was not referred would not render the order/judgment legally infirm as to warrant interference.

4. Then it was submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the application under section 12(2), C.P.C. Was patently barred by the as the decree which was impugned was passed on 18-3-1976, whereas the aforesaid application under the above provision was filed on 11-2-1990. His further submission was that since the relevant provision of C.P.C. Was amended in 1980 providing filing of an application under section 12(2) in place of a suit, there was no ambiguity or confusion as to the forum for contesting the above decree dated 18-3-1976 and, hence, the the spent in prosecuting the aforesaid suit could not have been excluded under section 14 of the Limitation Act.

5. We are inclined to `grant leave to consider, whether the finding of the trial Court that the respondents' application under section 12(2), C.P.C., was within the is in accordance with law. Leave is, accordingly, granted.

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