ISMAIL vs MEMBER, BOARD OF REVENUE, PUNJAB, LAHORE And 13 Other
This petition for special leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court order that dismissed an application to amend a writ petition. The petitioner sought to amend their writ petition to substitute a reference to Section 163-A of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967, with Rule 6-A of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Rules, 1968, arguing it was necessary to properly present their case. The High Court had dismissed the amendment application, noting that the petitioner's counsel was already permitted to rely on the correct rule during arguments, rendering the formal amendment unnecessary. The Supreme Court upheld this decision, holding that the High Court correctly prioritized the substance of the petition over technicalities. The Court affirmed that the non-mention or misquoting of a specific provision of law is a mere technicality that does not affect the jurisdiction of a statutory authority or the court's duty to grant relief. Consequently, as the petitioner had already been allowed to argue the merits based on the correct legal provision, the formal amendment was deemed redundant and leave to appeal was refused.
- Does the misquoting of a legal provision in a writ petition necessitate a formal amendment if the court allows arguments based on the correct provision?
- Is the non-mention or incorrect citation of a provision of law a fatal defect that vitiates proceedings?
- Does the High Court have a duty to grant relief based on the substance of a petition despite technical errors in the pleadings?
- Section 163-A, West Pakistan Land Revenue Act 1967
- Order VI Rule 17, Code of Civil Procedure 1908
- Section 15, Code of Civil Procedure 1908
- Rule 6-A, West Pakistan Land Revenue Rules 1968
- Colonization of Government Lands Act 1912
IRSHAD HASAN KHAN J.--This is a petition for special leave to appeal from the order of the Lahore High Court, whereby the application of the petitioner seeking amendment of the writ petition was dismissed.
2. Land comprising an area of 25 acres was allotted to one Ahmad in Chak No.132/16-L, District Khanewal, under the Horse Breeding Scheme of the Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912. On the death of Ahmad as well as his widow Zainab, the District Collector made the allotment in favour of the petitioner by order dated 12-2-1988. On appeal by respondents Nos. 4 to 14, the Commissioner, Multan Division, Multan remanded the case to the District Collector for decision afresh, after hearing the parties, by order dated 18-9-1989. This order was upheld in revision and review by the learned Member, Board of Revenue. The petitioner challenged the order of the Member, Board of Revenue, and the Commissioner by means of a Constitution petition inter alia on the ground that under section 163-A of the Land Revenue Act, 1967, the Commissioner had no jurisdiction to remand the case. During the pendency of the writ petition, an application under Order VI, Rule 17, read with section 15, C.P.C. Was moved by the petitioner for amendment of the writ petition to the effect that the phrase, 'section 163-A of the Land Revenue Act, 1967', be substituted by 'Rule 6-A of the Punjab Land Revenue Rules, 1968', issued by the Board of Revenue vide Notification No.689--89/2168, dated 12-9-1989.
3. It was contended before the High Court that section 163-A was incorporated in the Baluchistan Land Revenue Act and not in the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967 but wrong provision of law was quoted in the writ petition due to inadvertence. The application was disposed of with the observation that the amendment was not necessary, in that, the learned counsel had already relied on Rule 6-A of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Rules, 1968 in support of his contentions, therefore, misquoting of the section would not make any difference.
4. Ch. Muhammad Ashraf, learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that the amendment sought was necessary for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties, inasmuch as, unless the writ petition was amended as prayed for, it would not be possible for the petitioner to argue the case on the strength of Rule 6-A of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Rules, 1968.
5. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is mis--conceived. A bare perusal of the impugned order shows that the learned Judge in Chamber rightly permitted the counsel for the writ petitioner to rely on Rule 6-A notwithstanding that in the writ petition reliance was placed on section 163-A of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967. Clearly, the contention raised by Ch. Muhammad Ashraf is to technical in nature. The High Court was right in looking at the substance of the writ petition and not mere technicality. The course adopted by-the learned Judge in Chamber was in conformity with the rule laid down by this Court in the case of Kala v. Board of Revenue and another (PLD 1985 Supreme Court 208) wherein it was held that "Non-mention of any provision of law is a mere matter of technicality and does not in any way affect jurisdiction of a statutory authority or result in vitiation of such proceedings". Also refer the case of Salahuddin v. Frontier Sugar Mills and Distillery Ltd. Tokht Bhai and 10 others (PLD 1975 Supreme Court 244) wherein it was observed that failure on the part of the litigant does not relieve the High Court of its Constitutional duty to afford relief where it is lawfully due. In the case of Salahuddin (supra), the petitioner therein claimed relief before the High Court under clause (2)(a)(i) of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1979. It was held that relief could not be refused to the appellants therein only on the ground that they did not invoke clause (2)(b)(ii) of Article 201 in the High Court. We are, therefore, inclined to agree with the High Court that there was no need to allow formal amendment in the writ petition, in the circumstances of this case. The object sought to be achieved through amendment had borne fruit when the counsel for the writ petitioner was allowed to argue in support of his contention with reference to Rule 6-A ibid,
6. In view of the above, we hold that the order of the High Court in these proceedings does not suffer from any legal infirmity warranting interference by this Court. Leave is refused.