Mst. NAZIRAN BIBI And ANOTHER vs Mst. NOOR BEGUM
This revision petition arises from a dispute over land where the petitioners challenged an appellate order regarding the limitation period for executing a decree. The core legal question was whether the limitation period for executing a trial court decree commences from the date of that decree or from the date of the final appellate court decision when an appeal remained pending against a co-defendant. The Court dismissed the revision petition, upholding the appellate court's decision that the execution application was filed within the statutory limitation period. The Court affirmed the doctrine of merger, holding that when an appeal is preferred, the decree of the trial court merges into the decree of the appellate court. Consequently, the limitation period for executing a decree is suspended or commences only from the date of the final decision of the appellate court, as established in the cited precedents of Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey and Maulvi Abdul Qayyum v. Syed Asghar Shah.
- Does the limitation period for the execution of a decree commence from the date of the trial court's decree or the final appellate court's decision?
- Does the doctrine of merger apply to the limitation period for execution when an appeal is pending against a co-defendant?
- Is the execution of a decree suspended under Article 182 of the Limitation Act 1908 while an appeal is sub judice?
- Article 182, Limitation Act 1908
ORDER
The facts giving rise to this revision petition are that there was a dispute of some land between Mst.
Nur Begum and Zubaida Begum (deceased) predecessor-in-interest of respondents Nos.2 to 10 on the one hand and the petitioners on the other hand. The said Mst. Nur Begum and Zubaida Begum filed a suit for declaration and possession against the present petitioners and, the Province of Punjab was also impleaded as defendant in the said suit. The suit was decreed by the learned Senior Civil Judge vide judgment dated 27-7-1987. The present petitioners filed an appeal against the said judgment and decree dated 27-7-1987 before the District Judge, Sialkot which was heard by the learned Additional District Judge and the learned Additional District Judge vide order dated 5-3-1988 dismissed the appeal to the extent of the present petitioners but as the Province of Punjab was also a party, therefore, the appeal remained pending to the extent of the Province of Punjab. On the constitution of the District of Narowal the said appeal was transferred to the learned Additional District Judge, Narowal who vide his order dated 13-4-1993 deleted the Province of Punjab and dismissed the appeal as a whole.
2. After dismissal of the appeal on 13-4-1993 the present respondents filed an application for execution of the decree before the learned Senior Civil Judge, Narowal on 27-4-1993 but the application of execution was dismissed by the Senior Civil Judge vide his order dated 14-9-1994, the same being barred by time.
3. The respondents filed an appeal against the order dated 14-9-1994 of the Senior Civil Judge before the learned Additional District Judge, Shakargarh who vide his order dated 15-9-1996 accepted the appeal, set aside the order of the learned Senior Civil Judge dated 14-9-1994 and directed for proceedings on the application of the execution to the learned Senior Civil Judge.
4.Against the aforesaid order dated 15-9-1996 the petitioners have filed this revision petition with the assertion that the execution petition is barred by time. I have heard the preliminary arguments addressed by the learned counsel for the petitioners who canvassed that the appeal against the petitioners was disposed of on 5-3-1988 on merits and the limitation started therefrom. However, he admitted that the appeal remained pending and the order of status quo was operative till its final decision afterwards on 13-4-1993. This is the crux of the matter to make me hold that due to the, attraction of the theory of merger the limitation for execution of decree commenced from the date of decision of the Appellate Court on 13-4-1993 while the execution petition was filed on27-4- 1993, that is within time. It has been ruled in Nagendra Nath Dey and another v. Suresh Chandra Dey and others (AIR 1932 Privy Council 165) that so long there is any question sub judice in appeal preferred by any party execution period is suspended under Article 182 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. It would be interesting to note that the father of the nation Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad A.I Jinnah appeared for the appellant to expound this proposition before the Privy Council. It has also been commanded in Maulvi Abdul Qayyum v. Syed A.I Asghar Shah and 5 others (1992 SCM R 241) that the period of limitation for execution of decree commences from the date of decision of Appellate Court on the rule that the decree of the trial Court merges into the decree of the Appellate Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner could not meet the aforesaid legal proposition having relevancy in the matter.
5.For what has been said above, I hold that the impugned order passed by the learned Appellate Court is unexceptional as no irregularity or 8 infirmity has been found therein. I, therefore, dismiss this revision petition in limine.
Cited by 3 cases
- Haji Mir Badshah and others vs District Officer, Revenue & Estate/Land 2024 PHC 170, 2024 PLJ Peshawar 113
- BAKHTIAR AHMED vs Mst. SHAMIM AKHTAR and others 2013 SCMR 5
- HAKIM KHAN vs SAZ GUL and others 2004 YLR 351