MUHAMMAD RAZ KHAN vs GOVERNMENT OF N.W.F.P. and anothers

' MUNAWAR AHMAD MIRZA, J.---The facts succinctly mentioned are, that petitioner was appointed as Overseer Local Rural Works Programme, Miranshah on 8th August, 1970. Subsequently he was promoted as Sub-Divisional Officer with effect from 9th July, 1974. It is the case of petitioner that due to mala fide and departmental intrigues his services were arbitrarily terminated alleging willful absence from duty. Petitioner alleged that repeated representations were continuously made to competent authority, but no practical results. However, the department through letter, dated 16th November, 1991, informed the petitioner that being contingent paid employee, he was not entitled to reinstatement. Petitioner again perused the matter departmentally and approached senior executive authorities of N.-W.F.P., but having failed, he instituted appeal before Service Tribunal, Peshawar on 14th September, 1995. It was asserted that order regarding termination of petitioner was passed by incompetent authority without adhering to requirements of efficiency and discipline rules, and action or the representations were unjustifiably delayed. The Tribunal considering all aspects has dismissed the appeal by means of judgment dated 14-5-1996; assailed through present petition for leave to appeal.

2. Mr. Abdul Aziz Kundi, Advocate-on-Record, appearing for petitioner emphatically raised following contentions:--

(i) Petitioner has throughout persued the matter by continuously making representations, therefore, delay in filing the appeal is inconsequential.

(ii) Original order concerning removal of petitioner from service, dated 4th July, 1979, has been passed by authority which was not competent under law, without conforming to necessary formalities prescribed under relevant rules.

(iii) Even otherwise limitation does not operate against void orders.

(iv) The Tribunal misconstrued law concerning limitation and entitlement of petitioner to reinstatement in service. Thus, impugned judgment is inherently defective.

3. Firstly, it is an admitted feature of the case that petitioner was removed from service on 4-7-1979, almost sixteen years prior to instituting proceeding before Service Tribunal Learned counsel has greatly stressed that petitioner continued submitting departmental representations but competent Authority grossly failed to show proper attention. Needless to say that procedure or period for seeking departmental remedies and approaching Service Tribunal for redress of grievance has been expressly prescribed under the law. Obviously mere repetitions of representation would not by itself enlarge prescribed period of limitation. Any relaxed view in this behalf would tend to defeat real object and spirit of law which consciously restricts and controls period for availing relief. To supplement this view reference may be made to judgment reported as PLD 1985 SC 309 (316-317), Government of Pakistan v. Bashiruddin and 1990 SCM R 1440, Muhammad Hasham v. Inspector- General of Police, Punjab and 2 others.

4. Secondly, there is no cavil to the proposition that normally constraints of limitation- do not apply against void orders as held in case of Muhammad Shafi v. Mushtaque Ahmed 1996 SCMR 865.

Nevertheless every case is distinguishable on its facts and circumstances. It is undoubtedly imperative for aggrieved party to persue legal remedies with utmost diligence and satisfy conscious of the Court or quasi-judicial authority for approaching respective forums beyond prescribed limitation, even if objections to that effect were not raised. This principle has been discussed in PLD 1985 SC 153 (Hakim Muhammad Buta and another v. Habib Ahmad and others) and PLD 1993 SC 147 (Province of Punjab and others v. Muhammad Hussain and others). Thus, aggrieved person seeking redress has legal obligation to justify ' each day's delay' for launching proceedings, because with lapse of time valuable right accrues to the opposite side. This view has been consistently maintained by superior Courts. However, reference may be made to judgments reported in (i) PLD 1996 SC 292 (Ali Muhammad and others v. Muhammad Shafi and others), (ii) PLD 1995 SC 396 (Government of Punjab v. Muhammad Saleem), (iii) 1986 SCM R 930 (Muhammad Feroze Khan v. Khalique Dad Khan and 28 others), (iv) PLD 1982 SC (AJ&K) 13 (Khadim Hussain Khan v. The State).

5. Now looking to applicability of limitation against void orders question would naturally arise whether right of such person against whom an adverse order exists would be un fettered, ignoring established principles and would enjoy limitless discretion to knock the door of justice whenever desired by him; or same should be regulated by judicious norms. We earnestly feel that unless certain constraints apply against right of challenging void order specially relatable to period of knowledge, the same may create complications leading to dangerous results. Principle of justice and fair play does not help those who were extraordinary negligent in asserting their right and despite becoming aware about alleged void order adverse to their interest remain in deep slumber. Therefore, according to our considered opinion, facility regarding extension of time for challenging orders cannot be legitimately stretched to any length of unreason period at the whim's, choices or sweet will of affected party. Thus, order termed as nullity or void could at best be assailed by computing period of limitation when he factually came to know about the same. When a person presumes that adverse order is a nullity or totally devoid of lawful authority and ignores it beyond the period specified by law of limitation, then he does so at his own risk. Therefore, in all fairness terminus a quo will have to be fixed, the date of knowledge of alleged void order; which too must be independently established on sound basis. In this behalf, we derive strength from the observations contained in PLD 1975 Baghdad-ul-Jadid 29 (Sayed Sajid Ali v. Sayed Wajid Ali) and 1978 SCM R 367 (S. Sharif Ahmad Hashmi v. Chairman, Screening Committee).

6. Lastly, adverting to broad facts of present case, it is quite apparent that even initial representation was admittedly made by the petitioner long after expiry of specified period.

Subsequently according to petitioner's own showing after receipt of alleged reply to representation dated 16-11-1991, he conspicuously remained silent without any plausible cause or justification for nearly four years. Therefore, with whatever angle claim of the petitioner is examined, same would be hopelessly barred by time. The N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal has elaborately discussed legal and factual aspects by assigning substantial grounds. There is hardly any impropriety, infirmity or defect in the impugned judgment.

7. For the above reasons, petition has no substance. Leave is accordingly refused.