MUHAMMAD TAJ And Another vs MEMBER, BOARD OF REVENUE And 3 Other
This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court order affirming a pre-emption decree granted by revenue authorities. The petitioners contended that the revenue proceedings were coram non judice due to the alleged failure to place the Law Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1976 before the legislature; that the suit was bad for partial pre-emption for excluding Shamilat-e-deh; that the pre-emption right did not extend to specific Khasra numbers; and that paragraph 25 of M.L.R. 115 was repugnant to Islamic injunctions. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the arguments regarding the validity of the 1976 Act and the repugnancy of M.L.R. 115 were not raised before the High Court and could not be entertained without evidence. Regarding partial pre-emption, the Court held that since the pre-emption claim was based on tenancy, the plaintiff was not required to include Shamilat-e-deh. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the pre-emptor's right extended to the specific Khasra numbers under his cultivation, as the vendors had sold their entire interest in the land.
- Is a pre-emption suit based on tenancy rights liable to be dismissed for partial pre-emption if Shamilat-e-deh is excluded from the claim?
- Does a pre-emptor's right of pre-emption based on tenancy extend to specific Khasra numbers under his cultivation when the vendor has sold their entire interest in the land?
- Can a petitioner raise new legal grounds in a petition for leave to appeal that were not urged before the High Court?
- Law Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1976
- Paragraph 25, Martial Law Regulation 115
ORDER
MUHAMMAD MUNIR KHAN, J.--This petition for leave to appeal directed against the order dated 28-11-1994 of Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi, arises from the facts that on 1-3- 1979, Muhammad Taj and Muhammad Nawaz Khan petitioners purchased land measuring 82 Kanals 17 Marlas in village Gharbal, District Rawalpindi through registered sale-deed from Muhammad Zahoor Iqbal, Muhammad Azhar Iqbal and Muhammad Tahir Mahmood. On 27-2- 1980, Ghulam Muhammad alias Gamman respondent No.4 filed suit for possession by pre-emption of land measuring 73 Kanals 3 Marlas in the Court of Collector, stating in the plaint that his right of tenancy/superior right of pre-emption did not extend to the rest of land. The suit was resisted. Plea of partial pre-emption was taken by the defendants/petitioners. Parties produced their evidence.
The Collector dismissed the suit on 21-2-1983 on the ground of partial pre-emption as Shamilat-e- deh was not included in the suit land. Feeling aggrieved thereby, Ghulam Muhammad alias Gamman, respondent, filed appeal before the Additional Commissioner (Revenue) which was accepted on 23-4-1983 decreeing the suit on payment of Rs.1,10,000. The present petitioners then filed Revision before the Member, Board of Revenue, against the order of Additional Commissioner (Revenue) which was dismissed on 4-11-1985. Feeling still not satisfied, the petitioners filed writ petition in the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi, questioning the legality/correctness of the judgments and decrees of Additional Commissioner and Member, Board of Revenue, which to was dismissed vide impugned order. Hence this petition for leave to appeal.
2. Before us, learned counsel for the petitioners has raised the following points: --
(i) That the proceedings in the pre-emption suit before the Revenue Authorities were coram non judice, in that, the Law Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1976 enforced on ?.6-4-1976 whereby Revenue authorities were authorised to try pre-emption suits, has to be placed before the concerned Legislature after the lifting of Emergency, within six months, which was not done;
(ii) that the plaintiff/respondent No.4 failed to include Shamilat-e-deh in the suit, so his suit was rightly dismissed on the ground of partial pre--emption; (i.e) that the petitioners had purchased fractional share in the Khewat and not specific Khasra numbers, so the pre-emption right of the respondent No.4 would not extend to the entire Khasra numbers under his cultivation.
(iv) that the provisions of paragraph 25 of M.L.R. 115 have been declared repugnant to injunctions of Islam and as such no decree could be passed in favour of respondent.
3. We have considered the submission made by the learned counsel carefully. We do not agree with him. The judgment of the High Court will show that Points at Nos.(i) and (iv) were not urged before the High Court at the the of hearing. The Affidavit of the counsel appearing for the petitioners in the High Court to the effect that he had raised these points but were not considered by the High Court has not been placed on record of this petition. As regards points Nos.(ii) and (i.e), these have been considered by the High Court and have been rejected for sound and good reasons. The superior right of pre-emption was claimed on the ground of being tenant of the suit land and not on the ground of being co-sharer in Khata or in Mahal/Mauna. So, the respondent No.4 was not obliged to pre-empt share of Shamilat-e-deh. The sale-deed at page 26 of the Paper Book will show that the vendors had sold their entire land and delivered possession thereof to the vendees/petitioners. Therefore, the plea of the petitioners that the superior right of respondent No.4 would extend only to fractional share in the Khewat and not to specific Khasra numbers in his cultivation is devoid of force. Considerations for interference on appeal or revision and considerations for interference in Constitutional jurisdiction are quite different. We do not see any legal infirmity in the impugned order/judgment whereby the High Court has refused to exercise its Constitutional powers against the orders impugned before it.
4. Leave to appeal is, therefore, refused and the petition is dismissed.