GHULAM ABBAS and others vs KARACHI ELECTRIC SUPPLY CORPORATION and 2 others
This matter arises from civil petitions seeking leave to appeal against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioners' appeals against the termination of their employment by the Karachi Electric Supply Corporation. The core legal question concerns the effect and interpretation of section 2-A of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, inserted on 10th June 1997, which brought employees of statutory corporations under the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal, and whether the Service Tribunal possesses jurisdiction to entertain appeals against termination orders passed prior to the said amendment, given that civil suits challenging the same had abated. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider the questions regarding the appropriate forum for remedy and the jurisdictional competence of the Service Tribunal under the newly inserted section 2-A. The Court ordered that status quo regarding the service of the petitioners be maintained until the disposal of the appeals.
- What is the effect of the insertion of section 2-A of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 on the forum to seek remedy for employees of statutory corporations?
- Whether the Federal Service Tribunal is vested with the power to entertain appeals against termination orders passed prior to the coming into force of section 2-A of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973?
- Section 2-A, Service Tribunals Act 1973
ORDER
' MUNIR A. SHEIKH, J.---This common order will dispose of Civil Petitions Nos. 1240 to 1263 of 1997 as question of facts and law are identical in all of them.
2. The petitioners seek leave to appeal against the judgment, dated 22nd October, 1997 of the Federal Service Tribunal through which their appeals against the order of Karachi Electric Supply Corporation terminating their services have been dismissed.
3. The services of the petitioners who are employees of the Karachi Electric Supply Corporation were terminated in March, 1997. They filed civil suits challenging the said order on the original side of High Court of Sindh, Karachi in which through interim orders, the orders of termination of their services were suspended by virtue of which they are still in service. On 10th June, 1997, section 2-A was inserted by way of amendment in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 according to which the service of Statutory Corporations and other Autonomous Bodies under the control of the Federal Government was declared to be service Statutory Bodies was declared to be a civil servant.
4. According to Mr. K.M.A. Samdani, Advocate Supreme Court, in three similar suits of the other employees, the Sindh High Court took the view that in view of this amendment in the Service Tribunals Act, their suits stood abated suggesting that the remedy was to file appeal before the Service Tribunal.
5. The petitioners as abundant precaution in order to secure their right to avail remedy against the orders of termination of their service filed appeals before the Federal Service Tribunal which have been dismissed by the said Tribunal though the impugned judgment or the ground that it was not vested with the power to entertain the appeals as the impugned order was passed before coming into force of amending Act upon 10th June, 1997 as a result of which the petitioners have been left with no remedy as on the one hand, the view taken by the High Court in such cases was that the remedy was available before the Service Tribunal whereas the Service Tribunal took the view that it was not vested with the jurisdiction to entertain the appeals. Since a question of law as to interpretation of newly inserted section 2-A of the Service Tribunal Act and its vires which is a question of public importance, is involved, we grant leave to appeal to consider as to what is the effect of the insertion of the said section on the rights of the aggrieved persons as to the forum to seek remedy and as to whether Service Tribunal was vested with power to entertain appeals of the petitioners and had declined to exercise jurisdiction. The parties shall be at liberty to raise other points at the time of hearing of the appeals. Since the petitioners are still in service as noted above, therefore, we order that status quo in respect thereof shall be maintained till the disposal of the appeals.