NIAZ ALI vs SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB, INDUSTRIES &
This petition for leave to appeal arose from a dispute over a mining lease granted to the petitioner for excavating stone at Sangla Hill. The lease was cancelled by the authorities on the grounds that the site was of historical significance, specifically associated with Alexander the Great. After the petitioner's civil suit challenging the cancellation was dismissed, the petitioner sought relief through successive writ petitions. In a prior writ petition, the petitioner's counsel explicitly abandoned the challenge to the lease cancellation, confining the claim to the removal of already excavated stone. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a new writ petition seeking to complete the lease tenure. The High Court dismissed this petition, noting the petitioner's prior waiver of the lease challenge and the finality of the civil court's dismissal. The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal, holding that a party cannot retract a clear concession made before a court, especially when no review application was filed to correct the record. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked to relitigate matters already decided by a competent civil court.
- Can a petitioner invoke constitutional jurisdiction to challenge a matter already decided against them by a civil court?
- Is a party bound by a statement or concession made by their counsel before a court if no review application is filed to challenge the record?
- Can a petitioner seek to revive a claim regarding the validity of a lease after explicitly abandoning that issue in previous litigation?
1. MUKHTAR AHMAD JUNEJO, J.---Leave to appeal is sought against a judgment dated 7-11-1996 delivered by Lahore High Court. Initially the petition was filed against the order dated 1-12-1996 passed by a learned Division Bench of Lahore High Court in Intra-Court Appeal No,543 of 1996, by which the Intra-Court Appeal was disposed of as not competent. On 8-1-1997 the learned counsel for the petitioner made statement that this petition be treated against the order dated 7-11-1996 passed by a learned Single Judge, which was assailed without success in Intra-Court Appeal No,543 of 1996. This matter was, therefore, treated to be a petition against the judgment dated 7-11- 1996.
2. Facts of the case as given in the impugned judgment follow:-- The petitioner was granted a mining lease to excavate ordinary stone from an area of 4.9 Acres situate in Sangla Hill against the bid money of Rs,20,000 for a period of two years commencing from date of work order i.e, 9-4-1980. The said lease was subsequently cancelled on the ground that the hillock from where the stone was to be excavated by the petitioner was found to be an historical area as according to the authorities concerned, Alexander the Great had fought a battle near the said hillock. This cancellation came at a time when the petitioner had already excavated a good amount of stone which was lying at the foot of the hillock."
3. Cancellation of the lease was challenged in a civil suit which was dismissed. Thereafter, the petitioner filed Writ Petition No,3297 of 1994. Said petition was disposed of with an observation that the respondent No,1 should dispose of application of the petitioner. Respondent No,1 dismissed the application under which the petitioner had sought lifting of the excavated stone from the site. At the same time, the respondent No,1 remanded the case to the respondent No,2 for deciding the matter afresh. A Local Commissioner appointed by the respondent No,2 reported that stone was lying at the foot of hillock. Petitioner's appeal was dismissed and so also his revision by the respondent No,1 on 3-5-1995.
4. Thereafter, the petitioner filed Writ Petition No,8413 of 1995, where his counsel took up the stand that since his suit challenging the cancellation of the lease was dismissed, he did not press issue any further except that he be allowed to lift. The stone already excavated by him. The writ petition was disposed of under an order dated 28-7-1996 and it was ordered that the petitioner be allowed to lift 40-truck load of excavated stone from the site in presence of representative of the department and that of the petitioner.
5. It was after all this, that the petitioner filed a fresh Writ Petition No,20326 of 1996 praying that he be allowed to complete the period of lease, by allowing him to work at the site as per terms and conditions of the agreement. Said petition was dismissed under the impugned judgment dated 7- 11-1996.
6. We have heard at length Mr. Shahid Hussain Kadri, learned counsel for the petitioner, who argued that a huge amount of Rs,20,000 was paid by the petitioner as bid money for enjoying the lease for two years with effect from 9-4-1980. Learned counsel retracted from the statement he made before the learned' Single Judge on 7-11-1996 to the effect that the petitioner be allowed to lift the stone already excavated.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner could not state if the ground for cancellation of lease was incorrect or unjustified or mala fide. Learned Single Judge in his judgment dated 7-11-1996 has stated as below:-- ...It was during the course of the writ petition that the learned counsel for the petitioner took up the stand in unequivocal terms that the suit filed to challenge the cancellation of the lease in favour of the petitioner having been dismissed, the petitioner did not press this issue any further and would confine his argument to the extent that he should be allowed to lift the stone already excavated by him. In the background aforenoted, the writ petition was heard and decided vide order dated 28-7- 1996.
8. It is difficult to digest the allegations by learned counsel for the petitioner that the statement attributed to him was not made by him. Had it been so learned counsel would have moved a review application against the order dated 28-7-1996. Even in the memo of Writ Petition No,20326 of 1996 it has not been stated that learned counsel did not make the statement attributed to him.
9. After having agreed not to press the issue regarding continuance of the lease, it does not lie in mouth of the petitioner to say that he be allowed to complete tenure of the lease as a lessee.
10. Moreover, after being non-suited by a civil Court, the petitioner had hardly any case for invoking Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court or of this Court.
11. Consequently, this petition stands dismissed.