Syed ZULFIQAR MEHDI and others vs PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES

' SAIDUZZAMAN SIDDIQUI, J.---The abovementioned petitions have been filed by some of the employees of Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (P.I.A.C.) directly before this Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan (hereinafter to be called as the Constitution') alleging that they have been treated in a discriminatory manner by the respondents inasmuch as they were denied back benefits of service on reemployment in P.I.A.C. While many other employees of the Corporation were allowed these benefits in similar circumstances. They have alleged violation of their fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 25 and 27 of the Constitution and have prayed that respondents be directed to extend the same benefits and advantages which have been granted by the respondents to the other employees of the P.I.A.C.

Whose cases were identical to those of the petitioners.

2. The petitioners were serving in different service groups in the P.I.A.C. When they were removed from service under M.L.R.52. In the year 1989, the then Government constituted a Review Board to examine the cases of employees who were removed under M.L.R.52, and to make appropriate recommendations in each case. The petitioners as a result of recommendations of the Review Board, were re-inducted in the service of P.I.A.C. The grievance of the petitioners before us is, that some of the employees, re-employed by the P.I.A.C. As a result of the recommendations of the Review Board, have been given preferential treatment by allowing them all the back benefits while the petitioners, whose cases are identical to those who were allowed back benefits, have been denied these benefits. The petitioners have particularly referred to the cases of Ghulam Mustafa Shah and Inayat Rasool, who have been allowed full back benefits on reinstatement in service. The petitioners have also referred to the case of petitioners in Constitutional Petition No,22 of 1995 and Civil Petition No,108-K of 1995, who were allowed similar benefits as a result of compromises entered into between the P.I.A.P. And the petitioners in those cases before this Court.

3. The respondent No,1 in its reply filed in the above petitions has denied the claim of petitioners and asserted that it implemented the recommendations of the Review Board in accordance with the directive issued by the Federal Government through Ministry of Defence (Aviation Division). The respondent No,1 has specifically relied on the following directions of the Defence Ministry issued to respondent No,1 vide O.M. No,112/JSAI/O/90, dated 17-1-1990:-- ' "Those ex-employees whose recommendation for re-employment by the Review Board has been specifically and separately endorsed by the Ministry of Defence, Aviation Division, may be offered re-employment in the service of the corporation in the same pay group/level in which they were working on the date of the termination, dismissal or retirement of their service. The Management may grant to them such number of advance increments in the same pay group as it may deem appropriate on a case to case basis. However, this will be done only in exceptional cases and not as a rule. The re-employed personnel will be given fresh 'P' numbers. This re-employment will be considered as fresh employment."

4. Referring to the case of Ghulam Mustafa Shah, the P.I.A.C. In its written statement took the position that the case of Ghulam Mustafa Shah is distinguishable as he was dismissed from the service on account of mistaken identity and therefore, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, in his case passed a specific order on 13-10-1993 for his reinstatement in service. Similarly, with regard to the case of Inayat Rasbol, the P.I.A.C. Contended in its reply, that his dismissal was found patently illegal and based on a wrong advice given by the then Director Legal Service/Director Administration (Mr. S. Ghulam Qadir Shah Jamote). In so far the cases of petitioners in Constitutional Petition No,22 o 1995 and Civil Petition No,108 of 1995 are concerned, the stand of P.I.A.C. In the written statement is, that the former Director Administration of P.I.A.C, unauthorisedly and unlawfully entered into compromise with them which was against the directive of Government and P.I.A.C. Has initiated action against him for this unauthorized act.

5. The above petitions when came up for hearing before this Court on 21-5-1996, notices were issued to Attorney General of Pakistan to assist the Court on the question of maintainability of these petitions under Article 184(3) of the Constitution. Since then, these matters were fixed in Court on a number of dates but were adjourned for one reason or the other. On 10th of February 1998 when these matters again came up for hearing only counsel for the petitioners and respondent No,1, P.I.A.C., were present. The learned Attorney-General was absent. We, accordingly, heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and P.I.A.C, (respondent No,1) at length on the question of maintainability of these petitions.

6. The learned counsel for P.I.A.C. Contended that the issues raised in the above petitions by the petitioners are grievances of personal nature and therefore, they cannot be treated as questions of public importance. It is further contended by the learned counsel for P.I.A.C. That no question of discrimination arises in the above cases as all the petitioners were re-employed by P.I.A.C. In accordance with the directions of Ministry of Defence which are binding on P.I.A.C. The case of each employee, it is contended by the learned counsel for P.I.A.C., is to be considered on the basis of its own facts and circumstances and therefore, such grievance cannot be generalized in the context of relief. It is lastly contended by the learned counsel for the P.I.A.C. That for redress of grievance of the employees of P.I.A.C. In respect of service matters, an alternate remedy is available under the law and as such for that reason too, the remedy under Article 184(3) is misconceived.

7. The learned counsel for the petitioners on the Other hand jointly contended that the question of discrimination is common in the case of all the petitioners, and therefore, it is not correct to describe it as a grievance of individual or a personal nature. It is further contended by the counsel for the petitioners that the respondent P.I.A.C. Is a public Corporation and a national flag carrier, which employs thousands of workers and discontentment and dissatisfaction amongst its employees arising from discriminatory treatment is likely to affect the efficient working of the Corporation which is a matter of great public importance and concern to the people at large.

Therefore, the grievance of the petitioners, who are the employees of P.I.A.C. And have suffered on account of discriminatory treatment of respondents, is a question of public importance in which the petitioners in particular and the employees of Corporation in general, are greatly interested.

8. In order to confer jurisdiction on this Court to entertain a petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution, it is necessary that two jurisdictional requirements must be established. Firstly, that the question raised in the petition is a question of public importance and secondly, it relates to the enforcement of a fundamental right guaranteed under Chapter 1, Part II of the Constitution (see Wasey Zafar v. Government of Pakistan PLD 1994 SC 621; and Shahida Zaheer Abbasi v. President of Pakistan PLD 1996 SC 632). The expression 'public importance' was interpreted in the case of Mazoor Elahi v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1975 SC 66) as follows:-- "Now, what is meant by a question of public importance. The term 'public' is invariably employed in contradistinction to the terms private or individual, and connotes, as an adjective, something pertaining to, or belonging to the people; relating to a nation, State or community. In other words, it refers to something which is to be shared or participated in or enjoyed by the public at large, and is not limited or restricted to any particular class of the community. As observed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Hamabai Framjee Petit v. Secretary for India-in-Coucnil (ILR 39 Born 279) while construing the words 'public purpose' such a phrase, 'whatever else it' may mean must include a purpose, that is an object or aim, in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals is directly and vitally concerned'. This definition appears to me to be equally applicable to the phrase 'public importance'.

' The learned Attorney-General is clearly right in saying that a case does not involve a question of public importance merely because it concerns the arrest and detention of an important person like a Member of Parliament. In order to acquire public importance, the case must, obviously raise a question which is of interest to, or affects the whole body of people or an entire community. In other words, the case must be such as gives rise to questions affecting the legal rights or liabilities of the public or the community at large, even though the individual, who is the subject-matter of the case may be of no particular consequence.

' Seen in this light, there can be little doubt as to the public importance of the questions arising in this case. I think I will not be far wrong in saying that it is not often that a single case raises so many questions of public importance touching the liberty of the citizen. In all systems of law which cherish individual freedom and liberty, and which provide Constitutional safeguards and guarantees in this behalf, any invasion of such freedom in circumstances which raise serious questions regarding the effectiveness and availability of those safeguards, must be regarded as a matter of great public importance."

9. The above observations of Anwarul.Haq, J. (as his Lordship then was) in Manzoor Elahi's case were quoted with approval in Ms. Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1988 SC 416).

10. In Shahida Zaheer Abbasi v. President of Pakistan (PLD 1996 SC 632), one of us (Justice Saiduzzaman Siddiqui), after examining the scope of the observations of this Court in Manzoor Elahi and Ms. Benazir Bhutto's cases held as follows:-- "From abovequoted passages, it is quite clear that whether a particular case involved the element of 'public importance' is a question which is to be determined by this Court with reference to the faces and circumstances of each case. There is no hard and fast rule that an individual grievance can never be treated as a matter involving question of public importance. Similarly it cannot be said that a case brought by a large number of people should always be considered as a case of 'public importance' because a large body of persons is interested in the case. The public importance of a case is determined as observed by this Court in Manzoor Elahi's case (supra), by decision on questions affecting the legal rights and liberties of the people at large, even though the individual who may have brought the matter before the Court is of no significance. Similarly, it was observed in Ms. Benazir Bhutto's case (supra), that public importance should be viewed with reference to freedom and liberties guaranteed under Constitution, their protection and invasion of these rights in a manner which raises a serious question regarding their enforcement irrespective of the fact whether such infraction of right, freedom or liberty is alleged by an individual or a group of individuals."

11. We now proceed to examine the controversies raised by the petitioners in the above cases in the light of the abovestated principles. The issues arising in a case, cannot be considered as a question of public importance, if the decision of the issues affects only the rights of an individual or a group of individuals. The issue in order to assume the character of public importance, must be such that its decision affects the rights and liberties of people at large. The objective "public" necessarily implies a thing belonging to people at large, the nation, the State or a community as a whole. Therefore, if a controversy is raised in which only a particular group of people is interested and the body of the people as a whole or the entire community has no interest, it cannot be treated as a case of public importance. Firstly, the controversy raised in the above petitions that the petitioners who were dismissed under M.L.R. 52 were not allowed back benefits on re- employment in the service of P.I.A.C. Cannot be treated as an issue of "public importance" as the decision of this issue is hardly of any significance to the people at large or to the whole community.

' The issue concerns only to a very limited numbers of employees of P.I.A.C. Secondly, the allegations of discrimination made by the petitioners are denied by the P.I.A.C. Both on legal as well as factual planes, and therefore, an enquiry into the factual aspects of the cases of petitioners as well as of those who were allegedly given preferential treatment by P.I.A.C. Has to be undertaken to decide the controversy. Such an exercise cannot be appropriately undertaken in these proceedings. It is also rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent P.I.A.C. That the case of each petitioner is to be decided taking into consideration the facts and merits of his case, for which elaborate and alternate remedy is provided under the law. We are, therefore, of the view that no question of public importance in the above petitions arises so as to confer the jurisdiction on this Court to entertain these petitions under Article 184(3) of the Constitution. We, accordingly, dismiss these petitions as not maintainable. No order as to costs.