GHULAM RASOOL and others vs Sh. MUHAMMAD IKRAM
This petition for leave to appeal challenges the order of the Lahore High Court dismissing the petitioners' second appeal against their ejectment from the disputed commercial premises. The core legal question concerns whether the concurrent findings of fact regarding the landlord's personal requirement for his son to establish a business were sustainable and free from misreading of evidence. The Supreme Court held that the concurrent findings of fact recorded by all the lower courts were unexceptionable and warranted no interference, as the petitioners failed to demonstrate any misreading or disregard of evidence on record. The petition was accordingly dismissed, with the petitioners granted one month's time to vacate the premises. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact in ejectment matters unless misreading or non-consideration of evidence is clearly established.
- Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding personal requirement can be interfered with without showing misreading of evidence?
- Can a landlord seek ejectment of a rented property for the establishment of an independent business for his son?
ORDER
' IRSHAD HASAN KHAN, J.---This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the order, dated 20- 3-1998 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore in S.A.O. No,18 of 1992 whereby the appeal filed by the petitioners herein against their ejectment from the basement of Property No,SE-9-R-35, Nishter Road, Lahore was dismissed.
2. A concurrent finding of the fact has been recorded by all the Courts below that the property in dispute was required by the landlord for the use and occupation of Nadeem (his son) who had no independent business and wanted to establish a business of his own in the rented premises.
3. The learned counsel was unable to show that the impugned order suffers from misreading or disregard of any evidence on record. The impugned order is unexceptionable warranting no interference. However, the petitioner is granted one month's time to vacate the premises in dispute.