MANAGING DIRECTOR, PUNJAB SEED CORPORATION, LAHORE vs Hazrat
This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment regarding the execution of a decree for compensation for land acquired for public purposes. The petitioner, Punjab Seed Corporation, contended that as a body corporate established under the Punjab Seed Corporation Act, 1976, it was not a party to the original reference proceedings and therefore the decree could not be executed against it. The core legal question was whether an executing court can refuse to execute a decree on the grounds that the judgment-debtor was misdescribed in the original proceedings. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the executing court cannot go behind the decree to challenge its validity based on a mere misdescription of the judgment-debtor. The Court held that the beneficiary of land acquisition is legally obligated to deposit compensation with the Land Acquisition Collector for disbursement to the affected landowners. Furthermore, the Court condemned the petitioner's use of delaying tactics to avoid paying compensation for land acquired decades prior, emphasizing that the State should not act against its citizens without just cause.
- Can an executing court go behind a decree to examine its validity on the ground of misdescription of the judgment-debtor?
- Is a body corporate established under a statute liable to pay compensation for land acquired for its public purpose even if not named in the original reference?
- Article 185(3), Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973
- Section 3, Punjab Seed Corporation Act 1976
' IRSHAD HASAN KHAN, J.---This petition under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, is directed against the judgment dated 23-10-1997 passed by the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, Bahawalpur in Execution First Appeal No, 1 of 1993/BWP.
2. The land in dispute has been acquired for Seed Processing Plant established by the Punjab Seed Corporation, petitioner herein.
3. The dispute relates to the execution of a decree arising out of acquired land by the predecessor- in-interest of respondents Nos.1 to 5 for public purposes vide notification dated 27-5-1978.
4. The precise grievance of the petitioner is that the Punjab Seed Corporation, being a body corporate, established under section 3 of the Punjab Seed Corporation Act, 1976, which could sue or be sued, was not joined as a party to the original reference, therefore, the decree could not be executed against them.
5. The learned Judge in Chambers repelled the objection raised by the petitioner in the following terms:- "The compensation having been enhanced by the Court, a decree has been drawn in terms of the judgment of the Court, therefore, it was not possible for the Executing Court to go behind the decree so as to look into the validity thereof and that too on the ground that the judgment-debtors have been misdescribed, for at the most it was a case of misdescription. Needless to add that the beneficiary is required under the law to deposit the compensation with the Land Acquisition Collector so that the same is disbursed to the person or persons whose land has been acquired. It is really astonishing that a semi-Government department is adamant to pay the compensation for the last so many years, although they have already utilised the land of the respondents. This attitude on the part of the appellant is condemnable for it is well-understood that the State is mother of the citizens but in the instant case it is pitched against its own citizens and for no just reasons. In the circumstances the order passed by the learned Executing Court does not call for interference."
6. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner at some length and perused the material on record. The learned Judge in Chambers was right in holding that it was a case of misdescription simpliciter. We regret to point out that the petitioner has been resorting to delaying tactics not paying the compensation to the respondents although the land had been acquired as back as in 1978. The impugned order is unexceptionable warranting no interference.
7. Resultantly, the petition is dismissed and leave refused.