Messrs TAUSEEF CORPORATION (PVT.) LTD., LAHORE vs LAHORE DEVELOPMENT

ORDER

This Intra-Court Appeal is preferred under section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 against the judgment, dated 18-2-1998 passed in Writ Petition No.4113 of 1997 and Writ Petition No. 12339 of 1997 by a learned Single Judge of this Court.

2. The detail of facts has already been given in the impugned judgment which need not to be reproduced to avoid repetition. The writ petitions mentioned above were brought against the action taken by respondent No. l whereby, the construction work was stopped at the site in June, 1995. The matter having been raised at different forums, finally the contract between the parties was terminated on 20-2-1997. That termination was challenged in the writ petitions aforementioned on the ground that cancellation of a lawful agreement through unilateral action was illegal, mala fide and without jurisdiction. In this context, it was contended that the agreement was wrongly cancelled by the respondents on the ground that the then Chief Traffic Engineer, TEPA, L.D.A. Had entered into the agreement without lawful authority and as such, the same was void ab initio. Hence it was alleged that this plea was not open to the respondents for cancellation of the agreement because the same was executed on their behalf by their former Chief Traffic Engineer and if there was any flaw in his powers of which he was vested, the delinquent department could not take advantage of their own in-competency in making appointment of unauthorised person to enter into public agreement. Besides that, the principle of locus poenitentiae (power of re-calling till decisive steps taken), prevented the respondents to retrieve or recall the agreement as the decisive steps had already been taken by the aggrieved party i.e. Appellants by acting upon the agreement and in pursuance of the same, the first floor was completed, hence the powers available to the respondents to cancel the agreement had come to an end after the decisive steps had been taken by starting the construction of the plaza by the appellants in pursuance of the agreement. In addition to that, it was urged that the writ petitions were competent because agreement was entered into between the parties under statutory provisions and as such, would be enforceable at law irrespective of the provisions contained in section 21(a) of the Specific Relief Act.

3. We have considered the foregoing points which have been discussed in detail by the learned Single Judge in his judgment. It is true that the work on the I agreement had started but admittedly the same was stopped in June, 1995. However, the appellants remained silent over stoppage of the work till the agreement was finally cancelled by the respondents on 20-2-1997 by addressing the impugned letter. In that situation, the delay on the part of the appellants would be relevant for seeking the discretionary relief under the extraordinary jurisdiction of writ petition. Even otherwise, the alleged loss suffered by the appellants due to termination of contract could be claimed in the form of damages for which a separate remedy under the normal law was available and could be invoked. In addition to that, the construction work which is dependent on the personal volition of the parties cannot be specifically enforced in its substantive terms in case of its breach. The only remedy provided for such breach of contractual liability entailed the incident of damages falling purely within the ambit of civil action under the plenary jurisdiction of Civil Court. Lastly, the agreement itself contained a clause for arbitration whereby the differences of opinion between the parties or any dispute arising out of the impugned agreement could be referred to an arbitrator for settlement instead of bringing legal action. It is, thus, obvious that an efficacious and effective remedy was available to the appellants in the form of arbitration or civil action under the normal law. The writ jurisdiction in such a situation could not be invoked. The impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge being unexceptionable does not call for interference in this appeal.

The same is accordingly dismissed in limine.